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Misconstructing Sexuality in Same-Sex Marriage
Jurisprudence
Jeffrey Kosbie*
ABSTRACT
Drawing on sociology, queer studies, and legal scholarship, this Comment
develops a textual methodology to study sexuality in court opinions. In particular, this
methodology uses inconsistencies between opinions to highlight how courts rely on
cultural assumptions. This Comment applies this methodology to eighteen state same-sex
marriage cases, identifying four analytic models of sexuality: sexuality consists only of
behaviors; sexuality belongs to lesbians and gays; society should regulate sexuality; and
marriage forms a normatively desirable model for sexuality. These models contribute
significantly to public discourse over the meaning of sexuality. Applying sociological
insights to narrow judicial models of sexuality suggests that courts fail to recognize the
diversity of sexuality and its importance to individual identities. This Comment argues
that courts should protect same-sex marriage through equal protection, rather than due
process, in order to maximize individual autonomy with respect to sexuality. Finally, the
Comment considers recent opinions that make progress towards broader judicial
understandings of sexuality.
INTRODUCTION
¶1

Baker v. Nelson suggests that ―[t]he institution of marriage as a union of man and
woman . . . is as old as the book of Genesis,‖ 1 while Jones v. Hallahan explains that
―[two women] are prevented from marrying . . . by their own incapability of entering into
a marriage as that term is defined.‖2 Standhardt recognizes ―that a homosexual person‘s
choice of life partner is an intimate and important decision,‖ but also emphasizes that
―the only sexual relationship capable of producing children is one between a man and a
woman.‖3 And Goodridge reasons that the ―laws of civil marriage do not privilege
procreative heterosexual intercourse between married people above every other form of
*
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particularly thank Professor Andrew Koppelman and Josh Kaiser for detailed comments on multiple drafts
of this work. I also thank Professor Scott Barclay; Professor Christine Percheski; Professor Len
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versions of this work at the 2010 Graduate Student Workshop at the Law and Society Association
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participants in these venues for their feedback. I also wish to thank the editorial staff of the Northwestern
Journal of Law and Social Policy, and in particular Margaret Cahoon, Orly Henry, and Lauren Matecki.
1
Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971).
2
Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Ky. 1973).
3
Standhardt v. Superior Court ex rel. Cnty. of Maricopa, 77 P.3d 451, 459, 462 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003)
(emphasis added).
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adult intimacy and every other means of creating a family.‖ 4 These cases all decide the
same legal issue—whether same-sex couples can marry—but incorporate different
assumptions about the meaning of sexuality and marriage.
This Comment examines sexuality in state same-sex marriage opinions, but its
implications are broader. Federal courts dealing with same-sex marriage have cited state
precedents.5 State courts addressing other areas of the law cite propositions developed in
same-sex marriage cases to broaden6 or narrow7 discussions of sexuality. 8 Perhaps more
importantly, same-sex marriage opinions influence public discourse in various ways. The
media may directly describe and cite them, 9 and activists may celebrate them.10
4

Goodridge v. Dep‘t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961 (Mass. 2003) (emphasis added).
Perry v. Schwarzenegger overturned California‘s Proposition 8, recognizing that marriage respects the
―dignity, respect, and stature . . . accorded to all other officially recognized family relationships,‖ while
domestic partnerships designate a ―lesser stature.‖ 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 994 (N.D. Cal. 2010), stay granted
pending appeal, No. 10-16696, 2010 WL 3212786 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d
384, 434, 445 (Cal. 2008), superseded by constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5 (amended
2008)). Gill v. Office of Personnel Management rejected an argument about children‘s welfare because
denying same-sex couples the right to marry ―prevent[s] children of same-sex couples from enjoying the
immeasurable advantages that flow from the assurance of a stable family structure.‖ 699 F. Supp. 2d 374,
389 (D. Mass. 2010) (citing Goodridge v. Dep‘t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 964 (Mass. 2003))
(overturning part of federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)).
6
For example, following Kerrigan‘s description of broad legislative intent in adding sexual orientation to
state antidiscrimination laws, a later Connecticut case held that a plaintiff could state a hostile work
environment claim based on sexual orientation harassment.
Patino v. Birken Mfg. Co., No.
CV054016120S, 2009 WL 1624365, at *12 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 15, 2009) (noting that Kerrigan v.
Comm‘r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008) held that gays and lesbians are a ―quasi-suspect‖ class
entitled to equal protection).
7
For example, in deciding whether the state‘s Sex Offenders Registration Act violated a fundamental right,
People v. Cintron noted that Hernandez held that marrying a partner of the same-sex was not a fundamental
right. People v. Cintron, 827 N.Y.S.2d 445, 453 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006) (citing Hernandez v. Robles, 855
N.E.2d 1, 9 (N.Y. 2006)). After citing Hernandez, the court explained, ―[i]f the right to enter into a same
sex marriage is not considered fundamental, the right to avoid stigmatization as a sex offender where
defendant has not engaged in any express sexual conduct most certainly cannot rise to this [fundamental]
status.‖ Id.
8
Goodridge has been cited by various subsequent Massachusetts cases that deal with issues of sexuality.
See, e.g., Parker v. Hurley, 474 F. Supp. 2d 261, 275 (D. Mass. 2007) (citing Goodridge for proposition
that state policies may improperly burden ―a very real segment of the community for no rational reason‖ in
support of conclusion that state has a rational interest in assigning school children to read a book that
depicts gay families in a positive fashion); Albright v. Morton, 321 F. Supp. 2d 130, 138 (D. Mass. 2004)
(citing Goodridge for proposition that state law should not give effect to private biases in support of
conclusion that labeling someone ―homosexual‖ is not per se defamatory); Charron v. Amaral, 889 N.E.2d
946, 950–51 (Mass. 2008) (citing Goodridge for proposition that marriage is the only way to access certain
state benefits in support of conclusion that these benefits cannot be extended retroactively to an unmarried
same-sex couple).
9
See, e.g., Robert Barnes & Ashley Surdin, California Supreme Court Strikes Bans on Same-Sex Marriage,
WASH. POST, May 16, 2008, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/05/15/AR2008051500589.html (explaining ruling In re Marriage Cases and
reactions on both sides); Anemona Hartocollis, New York Judges Reject Any Right to Gay Marriage, N.Y.
TIMES, Jul. 7, 2006, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/07/nyregion/07marriage.html
(describing reactions to Hernandez v. Robles).
10
See Jeffrey B. Kosbie, Shared Identity Discourse and Mobilization Around Marriage Equality, in
ALTERED STATES (Mary Bernstein & Verta Taylor eds.) (forthcoming 2011) (on file with author)
(describing how activist rhetoric shifted to ―It‘s Wrong to Vote on Rights‖ after Goodridge provided samesex marriage rights in Massachusetts).
5
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Politicians frequently offer views on same-sex marriage.11 State legislatures and the
District of Columbia have debated same-sex partner rights.12 Local governments have
created domestic partner registries and benefits for government employees. 13
These public debates about same-sex marriage describe marriage and sexuality in
normative terms. Proponents of same-sex marriage describe marriage as a civil
institution of state rights and benefits, or a fundamental right based on social recognition
of committed partnerships. Sexuality is irrelevant to the rights and benefits of marriage.
Opponents of same-sex marriage focus on tradition, procreation, raising children, and the
state‘s right to define normative social structures. The state should only sanction
sexuality through marriage.14 Through their significant role in shaping and defining the
public discourse, same-sex marriage opinions contribute to the assumptions about
marriage and sexuality underlying these debates. 15
By examining the eighteen state cases to address same-sex marriage over the past
forty years, 16 I seek to make two key contributions to the study of same-sex marriage
jurisprudence and studies of law and sexuality more broadly. First, I argue that courts‘
discussions of sexuality draw on and reflect underlying cultural assumptions about
sexuality. The way these assumptions are legitimized may be more important than the
actual legal decisions in the cases. I suggest a partial textual methodology for studying
sexuality. Second, I evaluate courts‘ discussions of sexuality within same-sex marriage
jurisprudence. I conclude that most present same-sex marriage opinions are based on
11

See, e.g., Patrick Healy, If Elected . . . Hopefuls Differ as They Reject Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
1, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/01/us/politics/01marriage.html (discussing
views of Presidential candidates Obama and McCain).
12
See, e.g., Valerie Richardson, New Hampshire Legalizes Same-Sex Marriage, WASH. TIMES, June 4,
2009, at A03, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jun/04/new-hampshire-legalizessame-sex-marriage/?page=1 (describing legislative debate in New Hampshire); Ian Urbina, D.C. Council
Approves Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2009, at A28,
available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/16/us/16marriage.html (describing vote by D.C. City Council); Karl
Vick, Gay Marriage Bill Suffers a Decisive Defeat in N.Y. State Senate, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 2009, at A09,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/12/02/AR2009120203910.html
(noting the unexpectedly wide margin in New York Senate vote).
13
See Robin C. Miller, Annotation, Validity of Governmental Domestic Partnership Enactment, 74
A.L.R.5TH 439 (1999) (listing cases on the validity of various local ordinances).
14
See Mary Anne Case, Marriage Licenses, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1758, 1769 (2005) (arguing that marriage
licenses sex because historically any sex outside of marriage could be subject to criminal laws).
15
See Kosbie, supra note 10 (contrasting how pro same-sex marriage activists responded to Goodridge by
focusing on constitutional rights, while anti same-sex marriage activists argued that the people should be
allowed to vote on same-sex marriage).
16
I only analyzed cases that squarely addressed same-sex marriage. I used WestLaw Key Number
92k4385 (Same-sex marriage) and Lexis Headnote Family Law / Marriage / Validity / Same-Sex Marriages
to develop a list of all relevant cases. I excluded cases that did not directly challenge marriage laws. See,
e.g., De Santo v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (holding that two males cannot enter
common law marriage in denying plaintiff‘s suit to divorce his former partner); B. v. B., 355 N.Y.S.2d 712
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974) (annulling marriage between female-to-male transsexual and natural female because
transsexual had no male sexual organs and so was considered female by the court); Storrs v. Holcomb, 666
N.Y.S.2d 835 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (dismissing suit to compel county registrar to issue marriage license
to male same-sex couple for failure to add state Attorney General as a necessary party); In re Marriage of
J.B. and H.B., No. 05-09-01170-CV., 2010 WL 3399074 (Tex.App. Aug. 31, 2010) (holding that Texas
court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear divorce petition of same-sex couple married in
Massachusetts). I also reviewed opinions for citations to other relevant cases. See infra Appendix (listing
all eighteen cases chronologically and briefly describing doctrinal basis of decision).
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narrow understandings of sexuality. At a minimum, courts should be aware of how
certain language may legitimate narrow cultural understandings of sexuality.
Part I of this Comment lays out my methodological and theoretical framework. I
highlight many of the relevant concerns for any textual approach to studying sexuality.
Part II argues that courts should protect same-sex marriage based on the equal
protection doctrine. Beyond the legal doctrine, I argue that courts should avoid using
language that may interfere with individual autonomy with respect to sexuality. I do not
present this as a legal argument, but rather as a consideration of the effects—intended or
unintended—of certain language choices.
Next, Part III outlines the history of state same-sex marriage court decisions. I
organize cases together based on major doctrinal issues that they address.
Part IV is the analytic core of the Comment, examining how courts embed narrow
assumptions about sexuality into same-sex marriage opinions. This Part illustrates
judicial constructions of sexuality with as much empirical detail as possible. It then
examines these constructions, arguing that most are based on narrow assumptions about
sexuality.
Part V examines how recent cases have moved towards greater respect for
autonomy with respect to sexuality. These cases draw on broader assumptions about the
meaning of sexuality. I conclude by emphasizing how this Comment speaks to studies of
law and sexuality more broadly.
I.

¶10

THEORIES OF SEXUALITY AND METHODOLOGY

Drawing on sociology of law and sexuality, I argue that law plays a central role in
the social construction of sexuality and marriage. From this, I develop a textual
methodology to study how court opinions construct sexuality.
A. Sexuality and Marriage Are Socially Constructed

¶11

Sexuality encompasses sexual identity and expression, attraction and orientation,
behaviors and practices, social attitudes and norms, and legal and political structures
constraining individual identities.17 I use social constructionist theories of sexuality to
understand the relationship between the individual and social aspects of sexuality.
¶12
Many people identify as straight, gay, lesbian, bisexual, queer, or another category,
but these labels do not have any fixed meaning. Societies define and construct different
categories over time.18 In the United States today, we might consider any man who has
17

I do not argue for a single definition of sexuality or consider all of the debates in the literature. See
INTRODUCING THE NEW SEXUALITY STUDIES: ORIGINAL ESSAYS AND INTERVIEWS (Steven Seidman, Nancy
Fischer & Chet Meeks eds., 2006), for a collection of essays and interviews about the meaning of sexuality.
In his influential book, Steven Seidman argues that the law, media, and social and political structures
regulate sexuality. See STEVEN SEIDMAN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUALITY (2003) [hereinafter
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUALITY]. Sexuality ―is not just one thing‖ and includes a broad range of
behaviors and emotions. See id. at 53; see also EDWARD O. LAUMANN, JOHN H. GAGNON, ROBERT T.
MICHAEL & STUART MICHAELS, THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF SEXUALITY: SEXUAL PRACTICES IN THE
UNITED STATES 3–34 (1994) (sexuality is socially constructed and related to race, class, and gender).
18
For example, Barry Adam and Elizabeth Armstrong both discuss how this process of social construction
happened in U.S. history. See BARRY D. ADAM, THE RISE OF A GAY AND LESBIAN MOVEMENT (1987)
(discussing how a gay identity emerged in the U.S.); ELIZABETH A. ARMSTRONG, FORGING GAY
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sex with another man to be ―gay,‖ but this is not true across different times and cultures.
For example, in some Latin cultures, sexuality is defined in terms of ―active‖ and
―passive‖ instead of gay and straight. 19 In the early United States, ―heterosexuality‖ and
―homosexuality‖ were not categories at all. 20 Sex between two women or two men was
considered deviant behavior equal to adultery and other sexual sins. 21
¶13
The federal government played an active role in constructing the homosexual as a
deviant political identity.22 A 1950 Senate Subcommittee report commented that ―[o]ne
homosexual can pollute a government office.‖ 23 Similarly, in March of 1950, the State
Department classified homosexuals as a ―security risk.‖24 The state did not merely
describe some preexisting category of ―homosexual;‖ the state created the category that it
described. A man who had sex with another man went from being someone who engaged
in deviant behavior to being a homosexual. Homosexual became an identity that could
be used to describe sexuality.
¶14
The state is not the only actor constructing sexuality. Social and cultural norms
also play a role. Today, being gay or homosexual carries much less stigma than it once
did. Our cultural understanding of what it means to be gay has shifted. State regulations
of homosexuality have also changed, but the causal relationship between law and culture

IDENTITIES: ORGANIZING SEXUALITY IN SAN FRANCISCO, 1950–1994 (2002) (focusing on how particular
organizations played a role in forming gay identities in San Francisco).
19
See Tomás Almaguer, Chicano Men: A Cartography of Homosexual Identity and Behavior, in MEN‘S
LIVES 433, 435 (Michael S. Kimmel & Michael A. Messner eds., 6th ed. 2004) (―It is primarily the analpassive individual (the cochón or pasivo) who is stigmatized for playing the subservient, feminine role. His
partner (the activo or machista) typically . . . gains status among his peers in precisely the same way that
one derives status from seducing many women.‖). But see LIONEL CANTÚ, JR., THE SEXUALITY OF
MIGRATION: BORDER CROSSINGS AND MEXICAN IMMIGRANT MEN 154–155 (Nancy A. Naples & Salvador
Vidal-Ortiz eds., 2009) (noting that ―activo‖ and ―pasivo‖ labels were seen as archaic by a group of Latino
interviewees).
20
See JOHN D‘EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES : THE MAKING OF A HOMOSEXUAL
MINORITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1940-1970 10, 53–79 (1983) (discussing social construction of
homosexuality as a sexual identity in the United States); see also JONATHAN NED KATZ, GAY AMERICAN
HISTORY: LESBIAN & GAY MEN IN THE U.S.A. (rev. ed. 1992) (discussing history of homosexuality in the
United States from the colonial period through the present); SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUALITY, supra
note 17, at 43–52 (discussing the social construction of heterosexuality as a sexual identity).
21
See D‘EMILIO, supra note 20, at 10 (―Colonists . . . did [not] conceive of homosexual acts as different in
essence from other sexual transgressions.‖).
22
For example, during World War II, the Army began to target homosexuals rather than homosexual
behavior. See STEPHEN M. ENGEL, THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION: SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY AND THE
GAY AND LESBIAN MOVEMENT 22 (2001). See generally Allan Bérubé, Marching to a Different Drummer:
Lesbian and Gay GIs in World War II, in HIDDEN FROM HISTORY: RECLAIMING THE GAY & LESBIAN PAST
383, 383–394 (Martin B. Bauml Duberman, Martha Vicinus & George Chauncey eds., 1989) (discussing
how wartime changes were critical to the emergence of homosexuality as an identity).
23
ADAM, supra note 18, at 58 (quoting a 1950 Senate subcommittee report entitled ―Employment of
Homosexuals and Other Sex Perverts in Government‖). Similarly, President Eisenhower signed an
executive order making suspected homosexuality a reason to investigate and dismiss government
employees. Exec. Order No. 10,450, 18 Fed. Reg. 2489 (Apr. 27, 1953) (Security Requirements for
Government Employment); see also ADAM, supra note 18, at 58 (noting that between 1947 and 1950, 1,700
applicants for government jobs were turned down because of homosexuality and 420 people were forced to
resign from government jobs); DAVID CARTER, STONEWALL: THE RIOTS THAT SPARKED THE GAY
REVOLUTION 14 (2004) (discussing the executive order).
24
ENGEL, supra note 22, at 27.
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is not clear.25 Moreover, at any one time different cultural norms construct sexuality in
different ways. Norms of homosexuality as deviant and acceptable exist in the same
society. Gay might mean different things in different parts of the country. 26 The crucial
point here is that some combination of social structures, cultural norms, and state activity
constructs multiple possible meanings behind different sexual identity categories.
1. Individual Identity Formation
¶15

If sexuality is socially defined, individuals still play a large role in defining their
own identities. I assume that sexual desires, feelings, and attractions are largely beyond
an individual‘s conscious control. 27 Whether they are based on biology, upbringing,
socialization, or some other mechanism, they are not a matter of choice in our traditional
understanding. When I talk about individual choice, I do not mean to suggest that
individuals are choosing their sexual attractions and desires. Instead, I refer to the
manner in which many people align their personal thoughts, desires, and behaviors with
cultural categories. 28 A woman who has only had sex with men might identify as
straight. But that same woman might identify as bisexual or a lesbian, even if she is not
presently attracted to other women. Individuals form identities by drawing on the various
cultural norms available. For some people, identities do not match up neatly with
behavior or desires. 29
¶16
Sexuality matters in different ways to different people. To some people, sexuality
is a fundamental part of their identity. To others, sexuality is of marginal importance.
People may identify as hypersexual or asexual. People may identify as straight, gay,
lesbian, bisexual, queer, or they may refuse to identify with any category. 30 Some gays
and lesbians may think of themselves as having actively chosen to identify as gay or
25

For example, Lawrence decriminalized sodomy based on constitutional privacy rights. Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). This decision may have been based, at least in part, on growing cultural
acceptance of gays and lesbians. On the other hand, this decision may also have prompted greater
acceptance of gays and lesbians.
26
See, e.g., MARY L. GRAY, OUT IN THE COUNTRY: YOUTH, MEDIA, AND QUEER VISIBILITY IN RURAL
AMERICA (2009) (arguing that understandings of sexuality in rural areas are markedly different than in
urban areas).
27
See LAUMANN, GAGNON, MICHAEL & MICHAELS, supra note 17, at 148–171 (discussing the relationship
between social norms and subjective sexual preferences).
28
See Randall L. Sell, Defining and Measuring Sexual Orientation: A Review, 26 ARCHIVES SEXUAL
BEHAV. 643 (1997) (explaining that sexual orientation consists of at least two components of behavior and
attraction, which do not line up neatly like some researchers have assumed).
29
See Wayne H. Brekhus, Social Marking and the Mental Coloring of Identity: Sexual Identity
Construction and Maintenance in the United States, 11 SOC. FORUM 497 (1996) (arguing that sexual
identities do not always match sexual orientation because social norms pressure people to identify in
particular ways); Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection for Gay, Lesbian,
and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REV. 915 (1989) (arguing that equal protection analysis should not
depend on showing that sexuality means the same thing to all lesbians and gays).
30
Many queer theorists argue that sexuality is non-linear. See, e.g., ANNAMARIE JAGOSE, QUEER THEORY:
AN INTRODUCTION 72–100 (1996) (defining queer theory as a critique of essentialist understanding of
sexuality). A linear scale assumes that sexuality only describes sexual attraction and any individual can be
located along a scale based on how attracted they are to men or women. Id. Non-linear theories claim that
sexual attraction cannot be described only on the basis of gender, and moreover sexuality is not only about
sexual attraction. See Gayle Rubin, Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality,
in PLEASURE AND DANGER: EXPLORING FEMALE SEXUALITY 267 (Carole S. Vance ed., 1992).
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lesbian,31 while others may feel like they had the identity of gay or lesbian thrust upon
them. Some men who have sex with men consider themselves straight or heterosexual. 32
How people identify may change over time. Moreover, race, gender, and class may all
intersect with how people identify as straight, lesbian, gay, or any other category. 33 For
example, black men who have sex with men are often described as on the ―down low,‖
and treated as a threat to black heterosexual women. 34
¶17
Law and politics intersect with culture to form the relevant context for individual
identity formation. For example, before the Stonewall Riots in 1969, the term ―gay‖ was
not commonly associated with homosexuality. 35 Post-Stonewall, radical gay liberation
activists chose to use the term gay partially to signify their new political orientation. To
these activists, ―coming out‖ became a central part of their identity and politics. 36 The
choice to identify as gay was partially in reaction to the legal marginalization of gays and
lesbians and the perceived political complacency of past activists. 37
¶18
While individuals draw on different cultural norms to define their sexuality, they
are not freely choosing between available norms. When the State Department labeled
―homosexuals‖ a security risk, it imposed an identity on many unwilling people. This
imposition does not require the power of law. When youth use the term gay or lesbian as
an insult, they may also be imposing an identity on someone. Even when sexuality is not
directly imposed on people, identity categories are not neutral or equal. Gay, straight,
bisexual, lesbian, and queer all carry their own value judgments. The cultural norms act
as a constraint on individual choice—identity choices entail consequences. Black men
who have sex with men may not identify as gay because of perceived costs of that
identity.38
¶19
Court opinions form part of the structure of social norms that influence how
individuals develop sexual identities. As far as possible, courts should not use language
that legitimizes certain meanings of sexuality. However, courts need to follow the law in
addressing the case before them. Given this tension, courts should at least be aware of
how their use of language matters. In some of the opinions I discuss, courts intend to
attack homosexuality, but in others courts appear unaware of how particular language
choices reinforce cultural norms and values attached to sexuality.

31

This is not to say that they choose the underlying sexual attractions.
See Almaguer, supra note 19, at 7 (―[I]s the man who lives with his wife and children, but from time to
time has casual or anonymous sex with other men, homosexual? Many men in this situation, when
interviewed for the purposes of AIDS research, did not identify themselves as homosexual.‖).
33
See Mignon R. Moore, Lipstick or Timberlands? Meanings of Gender Presentation in Black Lesbian
Communities, 32 SIGNS 113 (2006) (arguing that the relationship between sexuality and gender presentation
is not the same for black lesbians as it is for white lesbians).
34
See Russell K. Robinson, Racing the Closet, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1463 (2009) (examining HIV/AIDS and
role of race for black women and black men who have sex with men).
35
See ENGEL, supra note 22, at 39–46 (discussing the gay liberation movement).
36
Id. at 45.
37
Similarly, present coalitions—lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender—developed as activists fought
over who should be represented in the gay rights movement as it marched on Washington. AMIN
GHAZIANI, THE DIVIDENDS OF DISSENT: HOW CONFLICT AND CULTURE WORK IN LESBIAN AND GAY
MARCHES ON WASHINGTON (2008). Law and politics provided part of the cultural backdrop to these
debates. Id.
38
See Robinson, supra note 34, at 1496 (discussing social constraints on black men who identify as gay).
32

244

Vol. 6:1]

Jeffrey Kosbie
2. Marriage is Socially Constructed

¶20

As with sexuality, marriage is socially constructed. Marriage has been variously
based on money, sex, children, kin, social order, and individual romantic interest over the
course of Western history.39 Marriage today continues to hold symbolic power as a
marker of achievement and prestige, but people feel free to marry later, end unhappy
marriages, and forgo marriage altogether.40 As young adults are increasingly likely to
leave their parents‘ house before marriage, they also feel more independent and are more
likely to enter interracial or same-sex unions.41 The changing meaning of marriage
makes it an ideal issue with which to investigate relationships between law and
sexuality. 42
B. Methodology

¶21

The social construction of sexuality plays a significant role in the study of same-sex
marriage opinions. Judicial opinions help form the set of culturally available scripts that
people draw on in forming their own identities. Identity should be understood as an
output shaped by the law, rather than as an input into what the law should be. 43 The
specific language that courts use matters because the language reflects and reinforces
cultural norms.
¶22
I use the case of Bradwell v. Illinois44 to illustrate how identity is an output,
constructed by the court. Explaining why Illinois could prevent women from practicing
law, the case acknowledges that ―many women are unmarried and not affected by any of
the duties, complications, and incapacities arising out of the married state,‖ but states that
―[t]he paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil [sic] the noble and benign
offices of wife and mother.‖45 Bradwell does not merely describe women as a category;
39

In her book, E.J. Graff devotes a chapter to each of these, ultimately concluding that our modern
understanding of marriage as a romantic institution with free choice to enter and exit is a recent historical
creation. See E.J. GRAFF, WHAT IS MARRIAGE FOR?: THE STRANGE SOCIAL HISTORY OF OUR MOST
INTIMATE INSTITUTION (1999). Since the 1960s, states have changed gendered assumptions inside of
marriage, reduced regulations of sex outside of marriage, and introduced no fault divorce. NANCY D.
POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW 11–33
(2008). These changes are largely in response to the feminist movement. Id.
40
See ANDREW J. CHERLIN, THE MARRIAGE-GO-ROUND: THE STATE OF MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY IN
AMERICA TODAY (2009) (developing idea of ―marriage-go-round‖ to describe de-institutionalization of
marriage and changes in intimate relationships). See also STEPHANIE COONTZ, MARRIAGE, A HISTORY:
FROM OBEDIENCE TO INTIMACY OR HOW LOVE CONQUERED MARRIAGE (2005) (offering a historical look at
the relationship between marriage and romantic intimacy).
41
MICHAEL J. ROSENFELD, THE AGE OF INDEPENDENCE: INTERRACIAL UNIONS, SAME-SEX UNIONS, AND
THE CHANGING AMERICAN FAMILY 88–92 (2007) (tracing rise in interracial and same-sex unions to the
rising independence of young adults).
42
For example, Kathleen Hull claims that same-sex couples use marriage-like rituals to create symbolic
meaning of the law even without access to the formal institution of marriage. KATHLEEN E. HULL, SAMESEX MARRIAGE: THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF LOVE AND LAW (2006).
43
Here I draw on linguistic anthropology, which suggests that identity can be understood ―as the emergent
product rather than the pre-existing source of linguistic and other semiotic practices.‖ Mary Bucholtz &
Kira Hall, Identity and Interaction: A Sociocultural Linguistic Approach, 7 DISCOURSE STUD. 585, 588
(2005).
44
Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872).
45
Id. at 141.
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it constructs women as properly confined to the domestic sphere. Not only are women
unfit for practicing law, they need to be protected by having a separate sphere in the
house.46 Despite the Court‘s assumptions, there is no natural category of women as
separate and distinct from men. The Court is one actor that created gender as a
meaningful category, based on the idea of separate spheres. The specific language used
mattered because it was based on cultural norms.
¶23
As people read judicial opinions, they engage them in a textual manner. Opinions
offer a sort of narrative to directly describe potential meanings behind sexuality. 47 The
discursive power of legal texts to shape identities depends on how these texts are read
and understood. While some lawyers may treat court decisions as only a source of legal
rules, many non-legal actors reading them will react to how the text describes sexuality. 48
My approach to studying the same-sex marriage opinions thus entails a critical focus on
the text itself with an eye towards how the text is directed to an audience.
¶24
In studying how same-sex marriage cases draw on specific cultural assumptions, I
particularly look for inconsistencies across and within cases. These inconsistencies
reveal the different assumptions judges make about sexuality. In many states, the law
does not appear to offer settled answers regarding how to best protect sexuality or
marriage rights. This indeterminacy of law may be beneficial by allowing judges to
adapt old laws to new social situations. 49 In deciding how to apply law in an unsettled
area, judges make assumptions about what the law should do and how it fits in society. 50
Rather than look for new overarching rules that could synthesize these inconsistencies, I
treat inconsistencies as evidence of where judges have made assumptions about sexuality.
¶25
I read closely the text of all the majority opinions in the state same-sex marriage
cases. I analyzed the text at several levels, including individual word choice, sentence
construction, structure, and tone. 51 I also considered the relationship between text and

46

See Patricia A. Cain, Feminism and the Limits of Equality, 24 GA. L. REV. 803, 814–817 (1990)
(discussing Bradwell and the ―separate spheres‖ ideology).
47
Cf. Bucholtz & Hall, supra note 43 (reviewing linguistic anthropology literature that traces role of
language in creating identity).
48
Sociology of law uses the concept of ―legal consciousness‖ to describe how people understand and make
sense of the law. See Laura Beth Nielsen, Situating Legal Consciousness: Experiences and Attitudes of
Ordinary Citizens About Law and Street Harassment, 34 LAW & SOC‘Y REV. 1055, 1058 (2000). People
may have ideas of what is or is not ―legal‖ that do not match the formal laws on the books. See id. Thus,
to a non-legal audience, the legal rules announced in a case may not matter to legal consciousness. Cf. id.
at 1085–1088 (finding that attitude towards the First Amendment does not explain individual‘s opinions on
legal regulation of offensive speech).
49
Describing the indeterminacy of family law as a ―double-edged‖ sword, Kimberly Richman argues for
―cautious optimism‖ with respect to family law. KIMBERLY D. RICHMAN, COURTING CHANGE: QUEER
PARENTS, JUDGES, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN FAMILY LAW 7 (2009). She suggests that ―a
feminist approach to legal indeterminacy . . . [should be] wary of the potential for abuse by biased judges
but strategically and ideologically welcoming of the space afforded by this indeterminacy to respond to
diversity and change in meaningful ways.‖ Id.
50
Id. at 3 (discussing the ―best interest‖ standard in child custody cases).
51
See, e.g., Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 10 (N.Y. 2006) (word choice of ―sexual preference‖);
Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 883 (Vt. 1999) (sentence construction describing personal benefits of
marriage but still written in very legal tone); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009) (opinion
structure begins with deconstruction of role of sexuality in marriage, emphasizing how sexuality is central
to daily life); Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571 (Md. 2007) (opinion tone is very clinical and removed).
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legal rules. 52 I coded all of the opinions for themes dealing with sexuality. While my
initial codes were based on concerns suggested by the literature on sexualities, I refined
the coding based on emergent themes. In coding cases I particularly looked for how
cases describe identities and for inconsistencies within and across cases. Once I finished
reading and coding cases, I grouped codes into the analytic themes I identify in Parts IV
and V. I then reviewed all of the examples identified with each theme, looking for
common approaches to judicial construction of sexuality. My analysis aims to develop
the full empirical complexity of these cases and move past the opinions as mere sources
of legal rules.
¶26
I reviewed opinions from the highest court to decide every case. The highest courts
have the most salience to non-judicial actors, so their decisions are more relevant to my
concern with how individuals understand and respond to the courts.53
II.
¶27

SAME-SEX MARRIAGE BASED ON EQUAL PROTECTION

Courts can determine whether laws are constitutional, but they are supposed to
defer to the legislature on matters of social policy. 54 If sexuality is a matter of social
policy, then courts should only apply constitutional and legal principles to determine if
same-sex couples can marry without considering what sexuality means. 55 As a legal
matter, I argue that courts can and should protect same-sex marriage based on
constitutional principles. Equal protection doctrine is more suited for this purpose than
fundamental rights doctrine.56 Moreover, I argue that courts should minimize language
that legitimizes narrow cultural discourses about sexuality. They should apply equal
protection analysis in a way that recognizes that sexuality has different cultural and
individual meanings.

52

Court opinions construct sexuality both through their text and through structural implications of their
doctrine. Cf. Deborah Widiss, Elizabeth Rosenblatt, & Douglas NeJaime, Exposing Sex Stereotypes in
Recent Same-Sex Marriage Jurisprudence, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 461 (2007) (using structural
implications of same-sex marriage opinions to expose gender stereotypes in the opinions).
53
Typically this means I reviewed the final opinion deciding a case. In Baehr v. Lewin, the Supreme Court
of Hawaii remanded the case to the intermediate court of appeals. In this case, I reviewed the supreme
court opinion and not the opinion on remand. See infra note 107 and accompanying text.
54
The Supreme Court has explained that it should be careful in creating new rights, ―lest the liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause be subtly transformed into the policy preferences of the Members of
this Court.‖ Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997); see also Andersen v. King Cnty., 138
P.3d 963, 968 (Wash. 2006) (applying this argument in same-sex marriage context).
55
In re Marriage Cases notes the relation of marriage to policy questions, but emphasizes that the court can
protect same-sex marriage based on constitutional doctrine. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 398–99
(Cal. 2008), superseded by constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5 (amended 2008) (―[O]ur
task . . . is not to decide . . . a matter of policy . . . but instead only to determine whether the difference in
the official names of the relationships violates the California Constitution.‖) (emphasis omitted).
56
Courts often combine legal analysis of equal protection and fundamental rights in marriage cases. While
the legal rules may overlap, courts still discuss the concepts separately and draw on different cultural norms
in discussing fundamental rights and equal protection. See Goodridge v. Dep‘t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d
941, 953 (Mass. 2003) (―In matters implicating marriage, family life, and the upbringing of children, the
two constitutional concepts [of equal protection and the fundamental rights of liberty and due process]
frequently overlap, as they do here.‖). See infra notes 108–109, for further discussion of due process and
equal protection in same-sex marriage cases.
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Individual identities are formed through a combination of autonomous choices and
social constraints. The law should maximize individual autonomy with respect to
sexuality. While a formal legal argument for sexual liberty or autonomy is beyond the
scope of my paper, 57 I am concerned with how court language may have real-world
consequences for autonomy. I bring up issues of autonomy to consider how court
language is potentially restricting what individuals are choosing in ways that the courts
may not even recognize.
A. Fundamental Rights and Marriage

¶29

The Supreme Court has considered marriage to be a fundamental right for over a
century. In 1888, Maynard v. Hill described marriage as ―the foundation of the family
and of society, without which there would be neither civilization nor progress.‖58 In
Meyer v. Nebraska, the Supreme Court recognizes the right ―to marry, establish a home
and bring up children‖ as central to the Due Process Clause. 59 Marriage is ―an
association that promotes a way of life‖ 60 and is ―fundamental to the very existence and
survival of the race.‖61 In Loving v. Virginia, the Court famously declares that, ―The
freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to
the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.‖ 62
¶30
In Zablocki v. Redhail, the Supreme Court struck down a Wisconsin law requiring
prior court approval for marriage for anyone with outstanding child support obligations. 63
The Court stated that:
It is not surprising that the decision to marry has been placed on the same
level of importance as decisions relating to procreation, childbirth, child
rearing, and family relationships. . . . [I]t would make little sense to
recognize a right of privacy with respect to other matters of family life and
not with respect to the decision to enter the relationship that is the
foundation of the family in our society. 64
¶31

Finally, in Turner v. Safley, the Supreme Court overturned a law prohibiting prison
inmates from marrying. 65 The opinion explains that ―emotional support and public
commitment . . . are an important and significant aspect of the marital relationship

57

I believe that protecting sexuality based on an individual liberty interest is consistent with the concerns I
raise in this Comment. Because my main concern is how courts use language that limits sexuality, I do not
formally make the legal argument for a liberty interest. See Katherine M. Franke, Longing for Loving, 76
FORDHAM L. REV. 2685 (2008), for an argument that courts should protect same-sex marriage based on a
liberty interest in sexual self-identity.
58
Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888).
59
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
60
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
61
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
62
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
63
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
64
Id. at 386.
65
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
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. . . [and] most inmate marriages are formed in the expectation that they ultimately will be
fully consummated.‖66
¶32
State courts describing same-sex marriage as a fundamental right use similar
language as the federal cases discussed above. 67 Marriage is protected as a fundamental
right because the court assumes that intimate sexual relationships, expressed through
marriage, contribute to some core sense of personal identity. By only treating a marital
relationship as fundamental, the courts privilege a particular type of relationship as
contributing to identity. These cases define marriage as a central goal in life. They draw
on a cultural script that may even define being single as a personal failure. While the
courts likely do not intend to equate being unmarried with failing in some aspect of life,
the references to the centrality of marriage reinforce norms of marriage as a personal
success.
¶33
There is also an assumption of sexuality as private and hidden in these cases. By
treating marriage as connected to the right to privacy, these cases represent sexuality as
properly limited to a private sphere. Sexuality means intimate sexual behavior that
occurs in private. Marriage is protected because it is connected to intimate sexual
behavior.
¶34
It is true that many people consider marriage to be an important life event. People
structure their intimate relationships around marriage. Marriage status helps define a
person; marriage is seen as an achievement.68 Plaintiffs in same-sex marriage cases
present fundamental rights arguments to the courts, and many of these plaintiffs likely
understand marriage as important to their own identities and sexuality. However, not
everyone considers marriage fundamental to their identity. A growing segment of the
population chooses to remain unmarried, even if they are in a long-term relationship.69
People may view marriage in instrumental terms. People may understand family as
centered around friends, roommates, brothers and sisters, or other relatives, rather than
centered around marriage. 70 Sexual intimacy might be separate from emotional and
financial support. When courts protect marriage as a fundamental right, they reinforce
cultural norms that marginalize non-traditional families and anyone who does not think of
marriage as a central life goal, for whatever reason.
B. Equal Protection and Marriage
¶35

Courts should protect same-sex marriage through the equal protection doctrine.
Equal protection does not require the same assumptions as fundamental rights about the
connection between marriage and sexuality. Courts can focus on whether the state has an
interest in restricting access to a particular set of rights and benefits. 71 Same-sex
66

Id. at 95–96.
See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep‘t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (2003) (―Marriage is a vital social
institution. The exclusive commitment of two individuals to each other nurtures love and mutual support; it
brings stability to our society.‖).
68
See CHERLIN, supra note 40, at 9.
69
See id. at 5.
70
See POLIKOFF, supra note 39, at 123–145 (arguing that rights and benefits should be provided to all
families, not only married couples).
71
See, e.g., Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (holding that state must provide rights and benefits to
same-sex couples).
67
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marriage can be protected under equal protection doctrine whether or not marriage is
fundamental to society. 72
¶36
There is a largely unrecognized tension in equal protection doctrine. As first
described in Carolene Products, the Supreme Court establishes suspect classifications to
provide a ―more searching judicial inquiry‖ in cases of ―prejudice against discrete and
insular minorities.‖73 In order to establish a suspect classification, the Court considers
the history of discrimination against a group.74
However, established suspect
classifications protect anyone on the basis of a particular trait that ―frequently bears no
relation to ability to perform or contribute to society.‖ 75 For example, the Supreme Court
held that affirmative action and school diversity plans might discriminate against whites
on the basis of race.76
¶37
Discrimination against blacks is prohibited by equal protection because blacks are a
―discrete and insular minorit[y].‖77 Discrimination based on race is prohibited by equal
protection because it is a trait unconnected ―to ability to perform or contribute to
society.‖78 These are both legitimate concerns, yet the Court largely fails to distinguish
between them. Discrimination based on race is conflated with discrimination against
blacks. Similarly, discrimination based on gender is conflated with discrimination
against women. And discrimination based on sexual orientation is conflated with
discrimination against gays and lesbians. This is not limited to the courts. People often
use race to mean black (or other minority groups), gender to mean women, and sexuality
to mean gays and lesbians. 79
¶38
In protecting same-sex marriage based on equal protection, courts should stress that
―[s]exual orientation plainly has no relevance to a person's ability to perform or
contribute to society.‖80 Courts should use ―sexual orientation‖ or ―sexuality‖ as the
basis of classification, rather than ―same-sex couples‖ or ―gay persons.‖81 Admittedly,
72

Courts may continue to intertwine equal protection and fundamental rights analysis in same-sex marriage
cases, as did the court in Goodridge. See supra note 56. Neverthless, equal protection doctrine is sufficient
on its own to support same-sex marriage.
73
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
74
See infra note 109, for a full discussion of equal protection criteria.
75
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973).
76
See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (holding that
Seattle‘s plan to racially balance public schools discriminated against white students on the basis of race);
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (holding that University of Michigan‘s diversity plan discriminated
against white students on the basis of race). Similarly, the Court used sex classifications to hold that men
must be admitted to a women‘s nursing school. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
77
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. at 153 n.4.
78
Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686.
79
In her book, Patricia Hill Collins argues that race, gender, and sexuality must be understood as
intersecting systems that shape everyone‘s lives. PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK SEXUAL POLITICS:
AFRICAN AMERICANS, GENDER, AND THE NEW RACISM (2005). She illustrates the limits of past feminist
research that focused only on women and anti-racist research that focused only on blacks. Id.
80
Watkins v. U.S. Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1346 (9th Cir. 1988), withdrawn en banc, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir.
1989) (citing Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686) (internal quotation marks omitted).
81
Compare In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008), superseded on other grounds by constitutional
amendment, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5 (amended 2008) (holding that sexual orientation is a suspect
classification), with Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 976 (Wash. 2006) (‖[W]e decline to conclude
that gay and lesbian persons constitute an inherently suspect class‖), and Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d
1, 11 (N.Y. 2006) (―Those who prefer relationships with people of the opposite sex and those who prefer
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present equal protection doctrine requires courts to consider gays and lesbians as a group
in order to establish sexual orientation as a protected category. 82 However, courts can
consider the treatment of gay and lesbians in the context of the broader argument that
sexual orientation ―bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society.‖83 For
example, the Supreme Court of California specifically frames its discussion of gays and
lesbians as evidence for its conclusion that sexual orientation should be considered a
suspect classification. 84
¶39
In some cases, the Supreme Court focuses on immutability as the touchstone of
suspect classification: discrimination based on ―characteristic[s] determined solely by the
accident of birth . . . would seem to violate ‗the basic concept of our system that legal
burdens should bear some relation to individual responsibility.‘‖ 85 Many state courts
follow this logic to decide that sexual orientation should not be a suspect classification.
For example, Conaway holds that sexual orientation is not a suspect classification
because there is insufficient evidence showing that it is determined ―solely by the
accident of birth.‖86 The court focuses on extensive medical literature that fails to
determinatively prove, in the court‘s opinion, that sexual orientation is biological or
natural.87 Conaway’s reference to medical literature highlights the medicalization and
pathologization of homosexuality. 88 This use of medical studies treats gays and lesbians
as medically deviant and draws on cultural norms that treat sexual attraction as a matter
of individual choice.89
¶40
Instead of looking to such studies, courts can and should deemphasize immutability
as a criterion for suspect classification. 90 Watkins explains:
relationships with people of the same sex are not treated alike . . . . This case thus presents the question of
what level of scrutiny should be applied to legislation that classifies on this basis.‖).
82
I agree with legal scholars who argue that equal protection analysis should focus on social structures
instead of individuals. Conflation of groups and classifications is part of this problem in equal protection
doctrine. See Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation
of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1995), for an argument that sex discrimination law should
prohibit social structures that create and enforce sex hierarchies, instead of looking for discrimination
―because of‖ sex.
83
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973).
84
In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 440–44 (determining that discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation is subject to strict scrutiny).
85
Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686 (citing Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972)).
86
Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 614 (Md. 2007) (citing Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686).
87
―The issue of the immutability of sexual orientation, however, is the subject of a multitude of recent
studies and nationwide debate. . . . We note only that there does not appear to be a consensus yet among
‗experts‘ as to the origin of an individual's sexual orientation.‖ Id. at 614, n.57 (reviewing an extensive list
of medical studies).
88
See Conaway, 932 A.2d at 614, n.57 (discussing several studies from psychology and other medical
fields).
89
While individuals may have some choice of identity labels, underlying attraction and desire are not a
matter of choice in this sense. See supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text.
90
Janet Halley argues that immutability is not a requirement for suspect classification and is unlikely to
become one. See Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the
Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REV. 503, 507–508 (1994). She describes arguments based on
immutability as a type of pro-gay essentialism, which treats gay identity as biologically determined. Id. at
517. She argues that legal advocates should seek a middle ground between pro-gay essentialists and progay constructivists. Id. at 546–66. Queer activists particularly argue against ideas of gay essentialism.
See, e.g., Joshua Gamson, Must Identity Movements Self Destruct: A Queer Dilemma, 42 SOCIAL
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Although the Supreme Court considers immutability relevant, it is
clear that by ‗immutability‘ the Court has never meant strict immutability
in the sense that members of the class must be physically unable to change
or mask the trait defining their class. People can have operations to
change their sex. Aliens can ordinarily become naturalized citizens. The
status of illegitimate children can be changed. . . . Reading the case law in
a more capacious manner, ―immutability‖ may describe those traits that
are so central to a person's identity that it would be abhorrent for
government to penalize a person for refusing to change them, regardless of
how easy that change might be physically. 91
¶41

Some state courts have protected sexual orientation as a suspect classification
without requiring immutability. 92 By minimizing the role of immutability in suspect
classifications, courts leave room for individual understandings of sexuality. Some gays
and lesbians do think of their sexuality as immutable and/or biologically determined.
Others may think of their sexuality as fluid and/or socially constructed. As Watkins
argued, for suspect classification purposes the only inquiry should be whether sexuality is
―so central to a person's identity that it would be abhorrent for government to penalize a
person for refusing to change [it].‖93
¶42
Once courts recognize that sexual orientation has no relation ―to ability to perform
or contribute to society,‖94 the courts can extend marriage to same-sex couples without
deciding whether marriage is a fundamental right. This reliance on equal protection
doctrine supports the cultural message that lesbians and gays are equal, downplaying the
emphasis on the cultural message that marriage is the only appropriate family model.
III.
¶43

DOCTRINAL HISTORY

Eighteen state cases over the past forty years squarely addressed various statutory
and constitutional challenges to laws prohibiting same-sex marriage.95 Nine cases
rejected the statutory and constitutional claims involved, 96 state constitutional
amendments preempted three cases,97 two cases required states to provide the benefits of
PROBLEMS 390 (1995) (arguing that queer movements must use queer identity as a basis for organization,
but paradoxically argue that sexual identity is itself fluid).
91
Watkins v. U.S. Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1346–47 (9th Cir. 1988), withdrawn en banc, 875 F.2d 699 (9th
Cir. 1989) (holding sexual orientation is immutable for purposes of suspect classification).
92
See, e.g., Kerrigan v. Comm‘r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 437 (Conn. 2008) (noting that immutability
might be relevant but not required).
93
Id. at 438.
94
Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686.
95
See supra note 16, for a full discussion of case selection and methodology.
96
See Standhardt v. Superior Court ex rel. Cnty. of Maricopa, 77 P.3d 451 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003); Dean v.
D.C., 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995); Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005); Jones v.
Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973); Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571 (Md. 2007); Baker v. Nelson, 191
N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006); Andersen v. King Cnty., 138
P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
97
See Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743 (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb.
27, 1998), superseded by constitutional amendment, ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25 (amendment effective
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marriage but not marriage itself, 98 and four cases required states to extend marriage to
same-sex couples. 99 I group decisions based on broad legal issues. 100
¶44
Beginning with Baker v. Nelson in 1971, the earliest state cases rejected same-sex
marriage in short opinions that focused on statutory construction and traditional meanings
of marriage.101 Courts in these cases considered whether state marriage statutes that did
not explicitly limit marriage to male and female partners should be construed to permit
same-sex marriages.102 Jones v. Hallahan was typical in the short treatment afforded
these claims: ―It appears to us that appellants are prevented from marrying . . . by their
own incapability of entering into a marriage as that term is defined.‖ 103 Singer also
rejects a claim that because a woman could marry a man but a man could not marry a
man, the marriage statute discriminates on the basis of sex under a state Equal Rights
Amendment.104 Plaintiffs in the Washington case analogized their claims to Loving v.
Virginia, where the Supreme Court held that a law prohibiting blacks from marrying
whites was racial discrimination. 105 The court rejected the comparison, writing that
Loving was not decided on the basis of racial classification but instead on the basis of
racial animus targeted at blacks. 106

1999); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), superseded by constitutional amendment, HAW. CONST.
art. I, § 23 (amended 1998); Li v. State, 110 P.3d 91 (Or. 2005).
98
See Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
99
See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008), superseded by constitutional amendment, CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 7.5 (amended 2008); Kerrigan v. State, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008); Varnum v. Brien, 763
N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009); Goodridge v. Dep‘t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
100
See infra Appendix (listing all eighteen cases chronologically and briefly describing doctrinal basis of
decision).
101
See Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 185–86 (Minn. 1971) (citing WEBSTER‘S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1384 (1966)) (reasoning that the ‖common usage‖ of marriage refers to man
and woman); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Ky. 1973) (reasoning that the ―common usage‖ of
marriage refers to man and woman); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1189 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (arguing
that gendered language of marriage statutes excludes same-sex marriage). Singer also held the state‘s
marriage statute did not discriminate on the basis of sex, in violation of the state‘s ERA, because the statute
treated men and women the same. Id. at 1190–1192.
102
See, e.g., Jones, 501 S.W.2d at 589.
103
Id. at 589.
104
Singer, 522 P.2d 1187 at 1191. See Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and
Gay Men is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994), for background and detailed analysis of
using gender discrimination claims to support same-sex marriage.
105
Singer, 522 P.2d at 1191–1192 (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)).
106
Id. at 1191. The court states:
In Loving, the state of Virginia argued that its anti-miscegenation statutes did not violate
constitutional prohibitions against racial classifications because the statutes affected both
racial groups equally. The Supreme Court . . . held that the Virginia laws were founded
on an impermissible racial classification and therefore could not be used to deny
interracial couples the ‗fundamental‘ right to marry. . . .
Although appellants suggest an analogy between the racial classification
involved in Loving and Perez and the alleged sexual classification involved in the case at
bar, we do not find such an analogy. The operative distinction lies in the relationship
which is described by the term ‗marriage‘ itself, and that relationship is the legal union of
one man and one woman.
Id. (emphasis added).
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¶45

Nearly twenty years later, in Baehr v. Lewin the Supreme Court of Hawaii became
the only state to hold that marriage laws created a sex classification, subject to the strict
scrutiny standard of review.107
¶46
Several cases, decided mostly since 2000, deny same-sex marriage rights based on
due process108 and equal protection doctrine: 109 Dean (D.C. 1995);110 Standhardt
107

Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 59–67 (Haw. 1993), superseded by constitutional amendment, HAW.
CONST. art. I, § 23 (amended 1998). Although this opinion was later overturned by a voter-approved
constitutional amendment, I focus on textual analysis of the original court opinion. On remand, the
intermediate court of appeals held that the state did not have a compelling interest and thus the marriage
statutes were unconstitutional. Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *21 (Cir. Ct. of Haw.
Dec. 3, 1996). The Supreme Court of Hawaii affirmed the court of appeals without opinion. Baehr v.
Miike, 950 P.2d 1234 (Haw. 1997). Before this decision could be implemented, the state amended its
constitution to allow the legislature to define marriage. HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23 (amended 1998). The
Supreme Court of Hawaii confirmed that the constitutional amendment and protected the original marriage
statute:
The passage of the marriage amendment placed HRS § 572-1 on new footing. The
marriage amendment validated HRS § 572-1 by taking the statute out of the ambit of the
equal protection clause of the Hawaii Constitution, at least insofar as the statute, both on
its face and as applied, purported to limit access to the marital status to opposite-sex
couples. Accordingly, whether or not in the past it was violative of the equal protection
clause in the foregoing respect, HRS § 572-1 no longer is. In light of the marriage
amendment, HRS § 572-1 must be given full force and effect.
Baehr v. Miike, 1999 Haw. LEXIS 391, at *6–7 (Haw. 1999).
108
Due process claims focus on whether there is a fundamental right to marriage. A fundamental right is ―a
significant component of liberty, encroachments of which are rigorously tested by courts to ascertain the
soundness of purported government justifications . . . . [F]undamental rights include voting, interstate
travel, and various aspects of privacy (such as marriage and contraception rights).‖ BLACK‘S LAW
DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). Courts describe fundamental rights as rooted in tradition and history, and
essential to the concept of ordered liberty. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding marriage is
rooted in tradition and essential to ordered liberty). State courts deciding same-sex marriage cases differ on
whether the right in question should be marriage or same-sex marriage, which can influence whether courts
find a fundamental right. Compare Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 990 (Wash. 2006) (holding that
there is no fundamental right to a same-sex marriage because same-sex marriage is not deeply rooted in
tradition), with Goodridge v. Dep‘t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 958–60 (Mass. 2003) (holding that
same-sex marriage falls within the fundamental right to marriage because marriage is an institution based
on privacy and personal autonomy). The California Supreme Court noted that the characterization of the
right influenced the outcome. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 421 (Cal. 2008), superseded by
constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5 (amended 2008). The court explained:
The flaw in characterizing the constitutional right at issue as the right to same-sex
marriage rather than the right to marry goes beyond mere semantics. It is important both
analytically and from the standpoint of fairness to plaintiffs‘ argument that we recognize
they are not seeking to create a new constitutional right—the right to ―same-sex
marriage‖—or to change . . . the existing institution of marriage. Instead, plaintiffs
contend that, properly interpreted, the state constitutional right to marry affords same-sex
couples the same rights . . . as this constitutional right affords to opposite sex couples.
For this reason . . . we consider it appropriate to direct our focus to the meaning and
substance of the constitutional right to marry, and to avoid the potentially misleading
implications inherent in analyzing the issue in terms of ―same-sex marriage.‖
Id.; see also Carlos A. Ball, The Positive in the Fundamental Right to Marry: Same-Sex Marriage
in the Aftermath of Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1184 (2004) (arguing that the federal
due process right to marriage includes a positive obligation on the state to recognize at least some
relationships as marriage, and so the state cannot claim that marriage is only a civil contract with
the state free to choose all parties eligible to enter marriage).
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(Arizona 2003);111 Morrison (Indiana 2005);112 Anderson (Washington 2006);113
Hernandez (New York 2006);114 and Conaway (Maryland 2007).115
¶47
These courts announced that there is no fundamental right to same-sex marriage
because there is no tradition and history of this right. The opinions followed Singer116 by
rejecting analogies to the history of interracial marriage. Standhardt, for example,
explained that the fundamental right to marriage announced in Loving was based on a
history of marriage as between a man and a woman, necessarily excluding same-sex
couples.117
¶48
These opinions held that marriage statutes do not violate equal protection based on
a rational basis analysis.118 Some of the equal protection analyses focused on the state‘s
109

Equal protection considers whether the state has a legitimate reason for classifying people on the basis
of sexuality for the purposes of defining marriage. Courts only require a rational basis test for most
legislation (for example, distinguishing between debtors and creditors). This requires that a law be
reasonably related to a legitimate government end; generally courts uphold laws under the rational basis
test. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 11 (N.Y. 2006) (deferring to legislature because
asserted interest in procreation is sufficient despite weak fit with marriage). Plaintiffs in same-sex marriage
cases argue that sexuality should be considered a suspect or quasi-suspect classification, both of which
require greater state justifications for its laws. The Supreme Court has held that race, alienage, and national
origin are suspect classifications, and gender and illegitimacy are quasi-suspect classifications. See Dean v.
D.C., 653 A.2d 307, 338–39 (D.C. 1995) (Ferren, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court has not clarified
exact criteria for suspect and quasi-suspect classifications, but often focuses on immutability as the
touchstone concern. Compare City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440–42 (1985)
(defining factors for suspect classification without listing immutability), with Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (focusing on immutability). See also Watkins v. U.S. Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1346
(9th Cir. 1988), withdrawn en banc, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (concluding that homosexuality should be
considered immutable for equal protection purposes because it is central to a person‘s identity and not
easily changed).
If sexuality is a quasi-suspect classification, then marriage laws must survive heightened scrutiny,
requiring that the state show that the laws are substantially related to an important government objective.
Kerrigan v. Comm‘r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 431–481 (Conn. 2008) (including an extended
discussion of criteria for quasi-suspect classification, determining that sexuality deserves quasi-suspect
classification, and that the state‘s marriage statutes cannot survive heightened scrutiny). If sexuality is a
suspect classification, then the state‘s marriage laws must survive strict scrutiny, requiring that the
government show the laws excluding gays from marriage are strictly tailored to a compelling government
interest. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 441–52 (Cal. 2008), superseded on other grounds by
constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5 (amended 2008) (holding that sexuality is a suspect
classification and that the state cannot present a compelling interest to justify excluding same-sex couples
from marriage). See generally Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a
Suspect Classification, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1285 (1985) (arguing that sexual orientation should be considered
a suspect classification).
110
Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995) (citing Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494, 503 (1977)) (same-sex marriage not deeply rooted in history).
111
Standhardt v. Superior Court ex rel. Cnty. of Maricopa, 77 P.3d 451, 461–64 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003)
(fundamental right of marriage related to procreation and privacy does not cover same-sex marriage).
112
Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (no equal protection violation by classifying
marriage based on sexuality).
113
Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006) (no equal protection violation).
114
Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 9–10 (N.Y. 2006) (same-sex marriage not deeply rooted in history).
115
Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571 (Md. 2007) (same-sex marriage not deeply rooted in history).
116
Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
117
See Standhardt v. Superior Court ex rel. Cnty. of Maricopa, 77 P.3d 451, 458, 460 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003).
118
See supra note 109.

255

NORT HW EST ERN JO URN AL O F L AW AND SOCI AL PO L ICY

[2011

legitimate interests in defining marriage, spending little time dismissing claims that
sexual orientation should be a suspect classification. 119 Other opinions engaged in
lengthy analyses of the criteria for quasi-suspect classification and particularly the
immutability requirement.120 While still following traditional due process and equal
protection concerns, more recent opinions in this group emphasized the court‘s deference
to the legislature.121
¶49
In 2005, the Supreme Court of Oregon held that a county official could not issue
marriage licenses to same-sex couples because a valid state constitutional amendment
defined marriage as between a man and a woman.122 The court did not decide whether
the benefits of marriage might be separated out from the institution because the plaintiffs‘
original arguments did not address that precise question. 123
¶50
Brause (Alaska 1998),124 Baker (Vermont 1999),125 Goodridge (Massachusetts
2003),126 and Lewis (New Jersey 2006) 127 recognize same-sex relationships, focusing on
due process rights rather than equal protection claims. Because these courts find a strong
interest in the benefits provided by marriage, they dismiss state claims to restrict marriage
to opposite-sex couples. Baker and Lewis separate the rights and benefits of marriage
from the institution itself, holding that the state legislature could choose to create a
parallel institution (civil unions) for same-sex couples. Goodridge stresses the social
significance of marriage as inseparable from the institution, holding in an additional
advisory opinion that the legislature cannot create civil unions as a substitute for
marriage.128

119

See, e.g., Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995) (noting that there is no majority on
equal protection classification, but court agrees that state interests are sufficient); Standhardt, 77 P.3d 451
(holding that no equal protection violation because no fundamental right to same-sex marriage).
120
See, e.g., Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 974 (Wash. 2006) (―But plaintiffs must make a
showing of immutability, and they have not done so in this case.‖). See supra notes 85–93 and
accompanying text, for a discussion of immutability.
121
See, e.g., Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 9, 12 (N.Y. 2006) (holding that state marriage statute does
not violate due process or equal protection, but stressing court‘s deference to the legislature on policy
issues).
122
This case began when the Multnomah County officials began issuing marriage licenses to same-sex
couples. Li v. State, 110 P.3d 91, 94 (Or. 2005). The circuit court held that the marriage statute violated
equal protection, and thus same-sex couples must be granted the right to marry. Li v. State, No. 040303057, 2004 WL 4963162 (Cir. Ct. of Or. Apr. 29, 2004), rev’d, 110 P.3d 91 (2005). The legislature
amended the state constitution while the case was on appeal to the state supreme court. See OR. CONST. art.
XV, § 5a (amended 2004). Following the amendment, the supreme court refused to consider whether the
benefits of marriage could be separate from the institution and held that the marriage licenses issued by
Multnomah County were never valid. Li, 110 P.3d at 390, 397.
123
Li, 110 P.3d at 98.
124
Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743 (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27,
1998), superseded by constitutional amendment, ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25 (amendment eff. 1999). Only
the trial court heard this case because of the intervening constitutional amendment.
125
Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (holding that the state must provide the benefits of marriage to
same-sex couples).
126
Goodridge v. Dep‘t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (marriage is a fundamental right).
127
Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006) (holding that state must provide equal rights to same-sex
couples but civil unions are acceptable).
128
In re Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004).
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Finally, the most recent cases, Kerrigan (Connecticut 2008),129 In re Marriage
Cases (California 2008),130 and Varnum (Iowa 2009),131 all hold that sexual orientation is
a quasi-suspect or suspect classification for equal protection purposes. Based on more
stringent equal protection analyses, these courts held that the state does not have a valid
interest in denying marriage to same-sex couples. Although these opinions discuss the
social significance of marriage and potential due process claims, their reasoning focuses
heavily on equal protection and the state‘s failure to justify any classifications based on
sexual orientation.132 In addition to securing same-sex marriage, these cases have
potential ramifications for other issues by setting a standard for measuring equal
protection claims based on sexual orientation. 133
IV.

¶52

NARROW CONSTRUCTIONS OF SEXUALITY AND MARRIAGE

This Part identifies four analytic themes within the same-sex marriage
jurisprudence of state courts: (1) sexuality is about acts or behavior; (2) sexuality belongs
to lesbians and gays; (3) society should regulate sexuality; and (4) marriage is
normatively desirable. Although I separate these themes for analytic purposes, they
overlap both conceptually and as they are used in the opinions. I develop these themes
by focusing on the various ways in which they are used.134 My discussion of each theme
has two goals. First, I answer the empirical question of how courts are constructing
sexuality. Second, I evaluate how courts draw on cultural norms that impose limited
ideas of sexuality.

129

Kerrigan v. Comm‘r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008) (holding that sexual orientation is a
quasi-suspect class).
130
In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008), superseded by constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST.
art. I, § 7.5 (amended 2008) (sexual orientation is a suspect class).
131
Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009) (holding that sexual orientation receives heightened
scrutiny but not deciding suspect or quasi-suspect classification).
132
Iowa‘s Supreme Court, for example, discussed the fundamental right of marriage in addition to equal
protection. Id. at 873 (―Yet, perhaps the ultimate disadvantage expressed in the testimony of the plaintiffs
is the inability to obtain for themselves and for their children the personal and public affirmation that
accompanies marriage.‖). However, the structure and tone of the opinion stressed equal protection as the
basis for the decision. Id. at 878 (―So, today, this court again faces an important issue that hinges on our
definition of equal protection. . . . How can a state premised on the constitutional principle of equal
protection justify exclusion of a class of Iowans from civil marriage?‖). Similarly, California‘s Supreme
Court held that strict scrutiny applied to the state marriage statutes based on both a fundamental right to
marry which included same-sex marriage and based on suspect classification under equal protection
analysis for sexual orientation; however, the actual strict scrutiny analysis was all discussed in terms of
equal protection. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 451 (―[Tradition] cannot properly be considered a
compelling state interest for equal protection purposes.‖).
133
This may be critical in California. When state voters approved Proposition 8, amending California‘s
Constitution to define marriage as between a man and a woman, they reversed the court on the definition of
marriage. However, In re Marriage also held that sexual orientation is a suspect classification, subject to
strict scrutiny. Proposition 8 did not change this holding. Regardless of the final outcome of the federal
Perry v. Schwarzenegger case, this holding on suspect classification will remain valid in California.
134
See supra Part I.B, for a discussion of methodology.
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A. Sexuality is About Acts or Behavior
¶53

Under this construction, sexuality is treated as being only a set of acts or behaviors.
Courts draw on cultural discourses that describe sexuality only in terms of sexual acts.
For example, many people would describe a woman who has sex with other women as a
lesbian. Romance, attraction, and feelings do not matter. A woman who has sex with
other women might not personally identify as a lesbian, but discourses that define
sexuality around behavior would label her a lesbian.
¶54
In the earliest opinions, homosexuality was not mentioned as a category at all. In
1971, in Baker v. Nelson, the Supreme Court of Minnesota wrote, ―The questions for
decision are whether a marriage of two persons of the same sex is authorized by state
statutes and, if not, whether state authorization is constitutionally compelled.‖ 135
Throughout this opinion, the court refers only to the choice of two individuals to enter a
same-sex relationship. 136 This reduces sexuality to the behaviors involved in (sexual)
partner choice. 137 Baker‘s homosexuality is erased: Baker is not a homosexual but a man
in a relationship with another man. The court draws on cultural norms that defined
sexuality based exclusively on behavior. In the process, the court constructs a set of
behaviors as indicative of a deviant identity.
¶55
While most courts no longer engage in this explicit erasure of homosexuality, many
still engage in various degrees of defining sexuality as based on sex or specific behaviors.
Some opinions impute a high degree of choice to enter same-sex relationships.
Standhardt explains, ―This court does not dispute that a homosexual person‘s choice of
life partner is an intimate and important decision.‖ 138 By writing about choice of life
partner, the court reduces sexuality to an active choice to enter particular relationships. 139
The court implicitly draws on cultural norms that assume that gays and lesbians choose
their underlying attractions. 140
¶56
This construct recurs in more recent opinions. In 2006, the New York Court of
Appeals wrote that the plaintiffs ―also say that discrimination on the basis of sexual
preference should trigger heightened scrutiny.‖ 141 Use of the word ―preference‖ implies
a choice with respect to underlying sexual attraction and behavior. 142 The language of
135

Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 185 (Minn. 1971).
See id.
137
It is true that courts always limit their discussion, necessarily reducing the social world to a small set of
relevant legal facts. Here, the court has defined sexual orientation as irrelevant, thus constructing the legal
inquiry as based on sexual behaviors. This focus on sexual behavior reinforces social norms of sexuality as
about behavior, regardless of the correct legal analysis. Cf. Widiss, Rosenblatt & NeJaime supra note 52,
at 487–89 (arguing that courts reinforce sex stereotypes by holding that same-sex marriage prohibitions do
discriminate on the basis of sex, even if the conclusion may arguably be legally justified under an ―equal
application‖ theory).
138
Standhardt v. Superior Court ex rel. Cnty. of Maricopa, 77 P.3d 451, 459 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003).
139
As noted above, it is true that everyone could be described as making a choice of life partner. In fact,
this is protected as part of the fundamental right of marriage. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12
(1967). However, by focusing on choice of life partner as the defining characteristic of sexuality, the court
is reducing sexuality to only a behavior.
140
See supra Part I.A (discussing social constructionist theories and degree of choice in constructing
identity).
141
Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 10 (N.Y. 2006).
142
This point is most clearly expressed by conservative scholars‘ opposition to the term ―sexual
orientation.‖ See, e.g., Robert H. Knight, How the Concept of “Sexual Orientation” Threatens Religious
136
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―sexual preference‖ is tied to a cultural discourse that assumes that gays and lesbians are
choosing a deviant lifestyle. If homosexuality is merely a preference, then it may not
deserve protection.143 By treating sexuality as only the act of sex, the court erases the
social and cultural norms and interactions surrounding sexuality.
¶57
The phrase ―same-sex couples‖ remains shorthand for defining sexuality around
homosexual behavior, even as courts move away from explicitly defining gays and
lesbians based on their sexual activity. In discussing the social turmoil in America
surrounding homosexuality, the Morrison opinion only uses the label ―same-sex
couples,‖ but never discusses ―homosexuality‖ or ―gays and lesbians.‖ 144 This reduces a
debate about sexuality to a debate about the propriety of same-sex partnerships.
Although the Morrison court‘s use of relationships moves beyond mere sexual acts, this
usage continues to rest on behaviors. Morrison frames the cultural debate solely in terms
of whether it is acceptable for people to engage in certain sexual behaviors.
¶58
It is true that same-sex couples are the plaintiffs in these cases, and thus courts
could write about the plaintiffs as same-sex couples without limiting gay and lesbian
identities to sexual behavior. Here it is instructive to examine the California opinion. In
re Marriage Cases discusses ―same-sex couples‖ many times, but only in sentences
where it is directly comparing same-sex couples to opposite-sex couples. 145 In other
places, the opinion discusses ―sexual orientation.‖146 Thus, the court discusses same-sex
couples while managing to avoid the implication that sexuality is a choice of attractions
and relationships. The court contributes to a cultural discourse of sexuality as more
complex than only behaviors.
¶59
By contrast, Baker and Brause use language that reflects cultural ideas of gays and
lesbians as choosing particular sexual behavior and attraction. In Baker, the Vermont
Supreme Court writes, ―Thus, the statutes exclude anyone who wishes to marry someone
of the same sex.‖147 Similarly, Brause claims, ―The question presented by this case is
whether the personal decision by those who choose a mate of the same gender will be

Liberty, 4 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 503, 513 (2010) (―The term ‗sexual preference,‘ which implies volition,
began to give way to ‗sexual orientation‘ in . . . the latter half of the twentieth century.‖) Knight argues that
the term ―sexual orientation‖ is used strategically to promote ―the idea that homosexuality is normal,
healthy, and should be promoted.‖ Id. at 503.
143
―Sexual orientation‖ has largely replaced ―sexual preference‖ based upon the growing cultural
acceptance that gays and lesbians are not choosing their underlying sexual attractions. See id. (noting and
arguing against this acceptance).
144
See Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 19 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
145
See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 400 (Cal. 2008), superseded by constitutional amendment, CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 7.5 (amended 2008) (―[The statute] has drawn a distinction between the name for the
official family relationship of opposite-sex couples (marriage) and that for same-sex couples (domestic
partnership).‖); id. at 402 (―[T]hat gay individuals and same-sex couples are in some respects ‗second-class
citizens‘ who may, under the law, be treated differently from, and less favorably than, heterosexual
individuals or opposite-sex couples.‖).
146
See id. at 442 (―Because a person‘s sexual orientation is so integral an aspect of one‘s identity, it is not
appropriate to require a person to repudiate or change his or her sexual orientation in order to avoid
discriminatory treatment.‖); id. at 443 (―In sum, we conclude that statutes imposing differential treatment
on the basis of sexual orientation should be viewed as constitutionally suspect under the California
Constitution‘s equal protection clause.‖).
147
Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 880 (Vt. 1999).
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recognized as the same fundamental right.‖148 While both decisions support the
plaintiff‘s claims, they focus on the behavior of entering a same-sex partnership as the
relevant consideration. I recognize some tension in my analysis here. The courts in
Brause and Baker likely did not intend to suggest that gay and lesbian sexuality is only
about particular behaviors. It is possible to read these statements as being only
descriptions of the parties to the cases. However, these statements could also be read to
reinforce cultural norms of gays and lesbians choosing certain behaviors.
¶60
Some opinions reflect more obvious tension over whether sexuality refers to
behavior or identity.149 For example, the Supreme Court of Connecticut wrote, ―[W]e
treat them as individuals seeking the right to marry the same-sex partner of their
choice.‖150 This sentence is descriptively true: the plaintiffs are seeking the right to
marry. By adding ―the same-sex partner of their choice,‖ the court reinforces the idea of
choosing sexual behaviors. Choice could refer generally to how people choose a
romantic partner, or it could refer to notions of lesbians and gays choosing to be attracted
to someone of the same sex.
¶61
Andersen struggles with a similar tension between identity and behavior: ―[S]ixteen
individuals, eight couples, sought marriage licenses from King County.‖151 The sentence
begins by identifying individuals, but then labels these individuals as part of same-sex
couples. It is not clear why the court felt it was relevant to define the plaintiffs as
individuals and as couples. One reading of this text is that the plaintiffs‘ homosexuality
is defined based on their same-sex relationships. This is likely not the meaning intended
by the court. In all of these opinions, I am pushing how language choices might reinforce
cultural norms that the court does not intend to endorse.
¶62
This tension is most obvious in the Goodridge decision, where the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts goes to lengths to avoid essentializing sexuality, but then
later in the opinion does precisely that: ―The department [of public health] argues that
this case concerns the rights of couples (same-sex and opposite-sex), not the rights of
individuals. This is incorrect. The rights implicated in this case are at the core of
individual privacy and autonomy.‖ 152 Here the court is careful to specify its concern with
individual identity and not with the behavior of entering a relationship. However, later in
this opinion, the court wrote, ―The ‗marriage is procreation‘ argument singles out the one
unbridgeable difference between same-sex and opposite-sex couples, and transforms that
difference into the essence of legal marriage.‖ 153 Despite the court‘s earlier care, here
lesbians and gays are explicitly reduced to being people who engage in gay sex. It is not
clear why the court wrote this at all. The court could have dismissed the procreation
argument without writing about it as an unbridgeable difference. While gays and lesbians
may have different feelings, attractions, social relationships, family structures, and

148

Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743, at *4 (Alaska Super. Ct.
Feb. 27, 1998), superseded by constitutional amendment, ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25 (amendment effective
1999) (emphasis added).
149
See supra notes 17–38 and accompanying text, for a complete discussion of the relationship between
identity and behavior,.
150
Kerrigan v. Comm‘r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 412 n.2 (Conn. 2008) (emphasis added).
151
Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 970 (Wash. 2006) (emphasis added).
152
Goodridge v. Dep‘t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 957, n.15 (Mass. 2003).
153
Id. at 962.
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cultural understandings, they are reduced to their inability to have procreative sex, ―the
one unbridgeable difference.‖
¶63
Some people think about sexuality in terms of only behavior. Sexuality might only
mean sex. But other people think of sexuality more broadly. By focusing on sexuality as
a set of behaviors, courts reinforce a particular cultural discourse. The language used in
opinions may act as a constraint on individual autonomy to define sexuality. 154
Moreover, to the extent that courts assume that sexuality is about acts and behaviors, their
equal protection analysis will likely be limited.
B. Sexuality Marks Gays and Lesbians as Deviant
¶64

Courts construct sexuality as marking gays and lesbians, limiting sexuality to
homosexuality. 155 Implicit in the process of marking gays and lesbians is the proposition
that gays and lesbians are deviant. This construction of sexuality as marking gays and
lesbians is related to but distinct from the last construction of sexuality as based on
behavior. Once courts move beyond sexuality as being only about behavior, they still
often only mark gays and lesbians with sexuality. 156 This is often not an explicit choice
on the part of courts, but rather implicit in comparisons of ―same-sex couples‖ or ―gays‖
to unmarked heterosexual couples.157 Courts frequently choose to only mention the
sexuality of gays and lesbians. This process works similarly to marking blacks with race
and women with gender.158 While some opinions construct sexuality as both defined by
behavior and belonging only to gays, other opinions move beyond sexuality as behavior
but still only mark gays. 159 This theme has three distinct sub-themes: sexuality as
imposed, sexuality as immutable and discoverable by the court, and sexuality as the same
for all gays and lesbians.
¶65
The process of marking is related to the tension in equal protection analysis
between protection of ―discrete and insular minorities‖ 160 and protection of traits that
―bear[] no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society.‖ 161 By focusing equal

154

I refer to autonomy as a normative rather than legal goal.
See SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUALITY, supra note 17, for a complete theoretical framework on the
social construction of sexuality.
156
Patricia Hill Collins argues that sexuality cannot be isolated like this, but must be understood as related
to race, class, and gender. See COLLINS, supra note 79 (focusing particularly on how gender analysis
should not only refer to women).
157
See id.
158
See id.; E. Patrick Johnson & Mae G. Henderson, Introduction: Queering Black Studies/"Quaring"
Queer Studies, in BLACK QUEER STUDIES: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY 1 (E. Patrick Johnson & Mae G.
Henderson eds., 2005) (comparing how queer studies ignores race and class, while black studies ignores
sexuality and gender).
159
For example, Standhardt states: ―This court does not dispute that a homosexual person‘s choice of life
partner is an intimate and important decision.‖ Standhardt v. Superior Court ex rel. Cnty. of Maricopa, 77
P.3d 451, 459 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (defining sexuality based on behavior of ―choice of life partner‖ and
marking only gays and lesbians with sexuality). On the other hand, Kerrigan states: ―[T]he statutory
scheme impermissibly discriminates against gay persons on account of their sexual orientation.‖ Kerrigan
v. Comm‘r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 412 (Conn. 2008) (deemphasizing behavior but still marking
gays and lesbians with sexual orientation).
160
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
161
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973).
155
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protection analysis on ―sexual orientation,‖ instead of gays and lesbians, courts would
minimize how much they mark gays and lesbians with sexuality. 162
¶66
The most striking illustration of this construction is found in an opinion by the New
York Court of Appeals:
Plaintiffs have not persuaded us that this long-accepted restriction is a
wholly irrational one, based solely on ignorance and prejudice against
homosexuals. . . . As the dissent points out, a long and shameful history of
racism lay behind the kind of statute invalidated in Loving.
. . . Racism has been recognized for centuries—at first by a few
people, and later by many more—as a revolting moral evil.
....
The idea that same-sex marriage is even possible is a relatively
new one. Until a few decades ago, it was an accepted truth for almost
everyone who ever lived, in any society in which marriage existed, that
there could be marriages only between participants of different sex. A
court should not lightly conclude that everyone who held this belief was
irrational, ignorant or bigoted.163
¶67

Here, the court attempts to distinguish precedent on interracial marriage, but in the
process suggests that sexuality only recently emerged when homophobia marked lesbians
and gays. In the court‘s telling, lesbians and gays became historically relevant only ―a
few decades ago.‖ Gays and lesbians are particularly marked with deviance. Racism is
immoral, so minorities are not deviant. Homophobia is not immoral, so lesbians and gays
are deviant. While the Hernandez court may have only intended to summarize the
relevant legal facts and history, the language and structure of the excerpt reinforces
cultural norms marking gay and lesbian deviance. In particular, the contrast between
racism as a ―revolting moral evil‖ and homophobia as not clearly ―irrational, ignorant or
bigoted‖ marks gays and lesbians as deviant.
¶68
Although less explicit in the process of labeling, Kerrigan explains that ―the
statutory scheme impermissibly discriminates against gay persons on account of their
sexual orientation.‖164 This can be read simply as a legal conclusion, which is likely
what the court intended. However, I argue that the language can also be read to mark
gays and lesbians with sexuality. The court could have written that the scheme
discriminates on account of sexual orientation. By adding ―against gay persons,‖ the
court potentially assigns sexuality to gays and lesbians.
¶69
In addition to an explicit process of marking gays and lesbians with sexuality, this
theme also emerges as meaning that homosexuality is different. The Morrison opinion
explains: ―As we have identified, at least one of the reasons the government [limits
marriage to opposite-sex couples] is to encourage ‗responsible procreation‘ by oppositesex couples.‖165
Heterosexuality is defined as ‗responsible procreation‘ and
162

See supra notes 71–93 and accompanying text, for a discussion of how courts should use equal
protection doctrine in same-sex marriage cases.
163
Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 8 (N.Y. 2006).
164
Kerrigan v. State, 957 A.2d 407, 412 (Conn. 2008) (emphasis added).
165
Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 29 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
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homosexuality implicitly becomes something different. Similarly, Brause claims ―just as
the ‗decision to marry and raise a child in a traditional family setting‘ is constitutionally
protected as a fundamental right, so too should the decision to choose one‘s life partner
and have a recognized nontraditional family be constitutionally protected.‖166 Tradition
becomes a marker for what is normal; by being nontraditional, same-sex marriage marks
lesbians and gays as deviant.167
¶70
By marking gay sexuality as different, opinions often assume that sexuality has
some fixed content that can be discovered. In particular, by improperly focusing on
immutability, courts assume that sexuality is fixed and discoverable. 168 In Hernandez,
the court dismisses studies of gay and lesbian parenting by claiming that ―[w]hat they
show, at most, is that rather limited observation has detected no marked differences.‖ 169
Implicit in this statement is an assumption that sexuality marks lesbians and gays in a
particular, consistent manner.
Sufficient studies could reveal how sexuality
(homosexuality) impacts gay and lesbian parenting. The court thus assumes the role of
constructing what sexuality legally means. 170
¶71
This use of scientific studies raises a related concern that courts construct sexuality
through a clinical prism. This is most obvious in Baehr, where the majority cites a
medical dictionary for the proposition that ―[a] ‗homosexual‘ person is defined as ‗[o]ne
sexually attracted to another of the same-sex.‘ Taber's Cyclopedic Medical Dictionary
839 (16th ed. 1989).‖171 The court‘s choice to cite a medical dictionary is particularly
significant. Homosexuality is treated as a pathological condition. Baehr gives medicine
greater authority to define sexuality than individual plaintiffs, cultural norms, or any
other source. How lesbians and gays understand their own identities becomes irrelevant
because medicine carries the authoritative definition of lesbian and gay identity. This
quotation ties together several themes. Gays (1) are objects of clinical study, (2) are
defined by a type of behavior, and (3) are thus marked as deviant.
¶72
Finally, consistent with discussions of immutability, the process of marking gays
with sexuality also results in grouping all gays and lesbians together as a homogenous
group. In Kerrigan, the Supreme Court of Connecticut writes, ―To decide otherwise
would be to penalize someone for being unable or unwilling to change [] a central aspect

166

Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743, at *6 (Alaska Super. Ct.
Feb. 27, 1998), superseded by constitutional amendment, ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25 (amendment effective
1999).
167
To many gays and lesbians, same-sex marriage is extremely traditional. See Kosbie, supra note 10.
Proponents of same-sex marriage implicitly embrace a traditional emphasis on marriage as defining the
family. See id. Describing same-sex marriage as non-traditional may be offensive. Id.
168
See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text, for an argument that immutability can be deemphasized
in equal protection analysis.
169
Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 8 (N.Y. 2006); see also Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 881 (Vt.
1999) (using social science evidence about gay and lesbian parenting to support conclusion that marriage
statute is both over and under inclusive because same-sex couples may become parents and opposite-sex
couples might not).
170
While courts are obligated to make legal decisions, these cases demonstrate that they also have the
ability to define terms such as sexuality by deeming certain facts either relevant or irrelevant.
171
Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 52 n. 11 (Haw. 1993), superseded by constitutional amendment, HAW.
CONST. art. I, § 23 (amended 1998).
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of individual and group identity.‖172 Here, the court more consciously constructs
homosexuals as a group. Many lesbians and gays understand themselves as belonging to
a group defined by shared characteristics. However, other gays, lesbians, and queers do
not define themselves based on shared characteristics. If the court‘s concern is how
sexual orientation ―bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society,‖ 173 then
the construction of group identity should not matter.
C. Society Should Regulate Sexuality
¶73

Courts use language suggesting that society has a strong and proper interest in
regulating the sexual behavior and activity of individuals. 174 Courts draw on social
norms and expectations, incorporating them into their analyses of state power to regulate
sexuality. In particular, courts might look at legal and social norms of procreation, child
rearing, sexual behavior,175 and acceptance of homosexuality. As sexuality becomes an
object of social regulation, individuals lose the right to determine their own sexual
identities. Not only does society define proper sexuality, courts demand individual
conformity to these social norms.
¶74
Social power and state power over sexuality overlap here, but are conceptually
distinct. Social power over sexuality refers to the social structures and norms that define
the proper norms of sexuality and sexual behavior.176 For example, social norms may
proscribe sex outside of marriage, sanctioning unwed mothers with stigma and
disapproval. While this form of social regulation does not legally prohibit non-marital
sex, it remains a powerful social mechanism. Women who engage in non-marital sex are
not legally punished, but may face social and moral approbation. State power over
sexuality refers to the state‘s ability to regulate aspects of sexuality through the general
police power. For example, laws on sodomy, marriage and divorce, contraception, child
support, families, and healthcare all potentially affect and regulate sexuality similar to the
social regulation discussed above.
¶75
Social regulation of sexuality is often implicit in court discussions of state interests
in regulating marriage. When courts describe social norms of sexuality, they often give
these social norms authority over individual sexuality. Unlike previous themes, social
regulation of sexuality emerges with respect to both gays and lesbians and heterosexuals.
This happens predominantly based on traditional heteronormative 177 concerns regarding
procreation and intimacy in marriage.

172

Kerrigan v. Comm‘r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 439 (Conn. 2008) (emphasis added) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
173
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973).
174
See Halley, supra note 29, at 946–63 (outlining legal regulation of homosexuality and relation to social
norms).
175
The Supreme Court has increasingly used the right to privacy to restrict the state‘s ability to regulate
private sexual behavior. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). Before Lawrence, sodomy was
constitutionally criminalized in some states.
176
See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
177
Heteronormative refers to social norms and institutions that assume that heterosexuality is natural and
proper. This includes an assumption that men and women are fundamentally different. Heteronormative
not only describes these norms, but also implies that they are used to sanction non-heterosexual identified
persons.
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Opinions from the 1970s drew heavily on traditional morality: ―The institution of
marriage as a union of man and woman, uniquely involving the procreation and rearing
of children within a family, is as old as the book of Genesis.‖ 178 Sexuality is removed
from individual control. There is no room here for any sort of autonomy or individual
choice with respect to sexuality. Instead, tradition dictates proper bounds of sexuality
through control of procreation and families. 179 Tradition is allowed to stand in for the
heteronormative demand of conformity with social expectations of procreation and
family.
While more recent opinions do not refer so explicitly to religion or history, they
continue to reflect social norms that assume society should regulate sexuality. In
Andersen, the Washington Supreme Court explains that ―the legislature was entitled to
believe that providing that only opposite-sex couples may marry will encourage
procreation and child-rearing in a ‗traditional‘ nuclear family where children tend to
thrive.‖180 This opinion depends on the heteronormative construction of sexuality
channeled through family and procreation. The traditional family stands in for social
regulation of sexuality. Society properly dictates the bounds of sexuality.
My concern is not with state regulation of child welfare. The state has an interest
in the well-being of children. The state also has an interest in other issues related to
sexuality, such as reducing sexually transmitted diseases and preventing sexual violence.
State laws should protect child welfare, promote public health, and control sexual
violence. I argue that even when the state has a valid interest, the law should not impose
constraints on individual autonomy any more than necessary. In the Andersen case cited
above, the court explicitly uses social norms to deny individual autonomy.
As already suggested, social regulation and state regulation of sexuality bleed
together in these opinions. In Hernandez, the New York Court of Appeals writes that
―[a] person‘s preference for the sort of sexual activity that cannot lead to the birth of
children is relevant to the State‘s interest in fostering relationships that will serve children
best.‖181 Here, social interest in regulation of sexuality and procreation becomes
explicitly the proper basis for state regulation of sexuality. 182 This also highlights how
court constructions of sexuality have real impact beyond marriage policy: Hernandez
offers a potential doctrinal hook for regulating gay and lesbian parenting, custody, and
adoption rights.
Social regulation of sexuality is very similar to state regulation of sexuality.
Indeed, courts are likely not consciously choosing between them. Nonetheless, there is a
distinction. Social regulation reflects greater concern with heteronormative traditions
dictating proper sexuality and state regulation reflects greater concern with legislative
prerogative. In Singer, the Washington Court of Appeals stressed legislative authority to
define marriage: ―The operative distinction lies in the relationship which is described by
the term ‗marriage‘ itself, and that relationship is the legal union of one man and one
178

Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971).
See Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Ky. 1973) (―[Marriage is] the institution whereby men and
women are joined in a special kind of social and legal dependence, for the purpose of founding and
maintaining a family.‖).
180
Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 983 (Wash. 2006).
181
Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 11 (N.Y. 2006).
182
Andersen, 138 P.3d at 969 (―[L]imiting marriage to opposite-sex couples furthers procreation.‖).
179
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woman.‖183 Similarly, in Morrison, the Indiana Court of Appeals wrote that ―[t]he key
question in our view is whether the recognition of same-sex marriage would promote all
of the same state interests that opposite-sex marriage does, including the interest in
marital procreation.‖184 Both of these opinions situate the authority to regulate sexuality
in legislative authority to control the state apparatus of marriage.
¶81
Other opinions bring in state regulation of sexuality through the state‘s role in
recognizing a marriage. In Li, the Oregon Supreme Court explains, ―In the state of
Oregon, ‗marriage‘ is a civil contract entered into with the consent of the state, between a
man and a woman, competent to so contract, in the presence of two witnesses,
solemnized by some one authorized by statute for that purpose.‖185 Similarly, in
Goodridge, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts makes the state a party to every
marriage. ―In a real sense, there are three partners to every civil marriage: two willing
spouses and an approving State.‖186 Both of these opinions use the state‘s role in
regulating marriage as a proxy for regulation of sexuality. These opinions reflect the idea
that it is proper for the state to demand conformity to particular social norms.
¶82
This use of marriage reflects an underlying tension as the state‘s role becomes more
about state regulation of marriage and less about regulation of sexuality. The state should
be able to regulate certain qualifications for marriage, including age, consent, and degree
of blood relations. The state should minimize how these qualifications interfere with
individual autonomy to define sexuality. When the Li court writes ―competent to so
contract,‖187 it sets parameters for marriage that do not interfere with individual
autonomy. When the same court writes ―between a man and a woman,‖ 188 it limits
individual autonomy based on heteronormative social norms.
¶83
Finally, some courts justify non-intervention in state marriage law based on
changing state regulations of sexuality. In doing so, courts assume that legislatures
should properly regulate sexuality based on changing social norms. 189 It is normatively
proper for the state to continually change the law with respect to sexuality. Courts have
also used evidence of changing regulations to argue that sexuality should not be
understood as static and that courts should properly intervene to prevent discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation.190 As with other points in my analysis, there is some
183

Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1191 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (emphasis added).
Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 23 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (emphasis added).
185
Li v. State, 110 P.3d 91, 99 (Or. 2005) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
186
Goodridge v. Dep‘t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 954 (Mass. 2003) (emphasis added).
187
Li, 110 P.3d at 99.
188
Id.
189
See infra notes 190–193.
190
Courts thus emphasize two poles for separation of powers: (1) the court should defer to the legislature
on policy, or (2) the court should enforce constitutional protections without deferring to the legislature. For
example, in Conaway, the court only applied rational basis review to the state‘s family law, because
―sexual orientation has not come of age as a suspect or quasi-suspect classification.‖ Conaway v. Deane,
932 A.2d 571, 608 (Md. 2007) (emphasizing judicial deference to legislature on non-suspect
classifications). On the other hand, In re Marriage Cases emphasized the historic role of the court in
applying constitutional limitations to state marriage laws. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 451
(Cal. 2008), superseded by constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5 (amended 2008). The court
explained that ―initiative measures adopted by the electorate are subject to the same constitutional
limitations that apply to statutes adopted by the Legislature, and our courts have not hesitated to invalidate
184
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tension here. The state has an interest in regulating sexual behavior and courts might
merely describe that interest, noting that these regulations change as social norms change.
However, this is still problematic if courts use the logic of changing state regulation to
restrict individual autonomy. Even where discussions of changing state regulations are
not problematic, the discussions highlight the relationship between state and social
regulation of sexuality.
¶84
In Hernandez, the New York Court of Appeals claims that ―[t]he idea that samesex marriage is even possible is a relatively new one.‖ 191 This statement is the basis for
the court‘s decision that the court should defer to the legislature on marriage, implying
that the state should regulate unfamiliar expressions of sexuality more than it regulates
heterosexuality. Similarly, in Andersen, the opinion begins with a lengthy discussion of
the proper role of the court vis-à-vis the legislature in regulating sexuality. 192 In
deferring to the legislature, the court articulates a proper understanding of sexuality as
subject to changing state regulations and fails to protect individual autonomy. 193
¶85
Recognizing overlapping claims of social and state regulation, Varnum raises, sua
sponte, a discussion of religion.194 The opinion recognizes that neither the state nor the
plaintiffs addressed religion, but writes that religion is culturally understood as the basis
of much of marriage law. The opinion explains that the state only has an interest in civil
marriage and that religious claims properly belong outside the court. 195 The court‘s
decision to raise religion of its own accord illustrates the relationship between state and
social regulation. Religion could be understood as competing with the state for authority
to regulate sexuality and marriage. Varnum suggests that the court at least needs to
recognize this competing authority in assessing the state‘s interests in regulating
sexuality. By emphasizing laws of civil marriage, Varnum recognizes but limits the
proper reach of social regulation of sexuality.
¶86
There are times when society properly should regulate sexual behavior. Moreover,
courts need to write about regulation of sexuality to decide same-sex marriage cases. My
concern here is how particular language in opinions reinforces the idea that society
should have authority to regulate all matters of sexuality. While some cases may intend
to imply that society should be able to regulate all sexuality, other opinions
unintentionally imply this.
D. Marriage as a Normative Goal
¶87

Courts construct marriage as a normative goal for intimate relationships and all
sexuality. 196 Historically, a married couple with children has been understood as the
basis of the family. Many people continue to identify married couples as the basis of the
measures enacted through the initiative process when they run afoul of constitutional guarantees.‖ Id. at
449.
191
Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 8 (N.Y. 2006).
192
Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 968–69 (Wash. 2006).
193
See id. at 984 (―The court‘s responsibility, instead, is to assure that DOMA was enacted in accord with
constitutional constraints and that the legislature properly exercised its power.‖).
194
See Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 904–06 (Iowa 2009).
195
Id.
196
This also occurs outside of same-sex marriage jurisprudence. See supra notes 58–70 and accompanying
text for a discussion of marriage as a fundamental right.
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family. Nonetheless, families and romantic relationships exist in many other forms. By
treating marriage as a normative goal, courts emphasize the desirability of the marriage
relationship. Marriage becomes an explicit state tool for regulating sexuality. Couples
are expected to marry and once married are expected to behave in certain ways.
¶88
There are at least four ways in which courts discuss marriage as a normative goal.
First, marriage can be described as appropriately containing sexual intercourse because of
concerns that sex is only properly directed at procreation within marriage. 197 This
includes the sense that heterosexuality is dangerous and must be contained. If
heterosexuals cannot control their sexual desires and behavior, then marriage will do so.
Second, marriage is understood as encouraging social stability by supporting long-term
relationships. 198 The courts code social stability with assumptions about marriage as the
basis for society. Other potential support structures are marginalized. Third, childrearing is best performed in a marriage because children develop best with both a father
and a mother.199 These first three senses of the normative goals of marriage reflect a
judgment that sex outside of marriage is immoral and a concern that the state should
encourage a particular family structure.
¶89
Finally, marriage can also be a normative goal in the sense of being a set of benefits
and responsibilities available to intimate relationships. 200 In this final sense, courts begin
to recast the relationship between marriage and gay and lesbian sexuality. 201 Courts do
not deny marriage‘s role as a social goal, but question whether exclusion of same-sex
couples is proper.202 Even when gays and lesbians gain judicial access to the rights and
benefits of marriage, marriage retains its normative status by defining long-term, statesanctioned, romantic relationships as the ideal expression of sexuality and family.
¶90
Marriage‘s normative power depends on state power to regulate sexuality. While
the last theme examined how courts assume that society should properly regulate
sexuality, this theme focuses on how that state regulation is used to normalize marriage.
In Singer, the Washington Court of Appeals explains that the ―[a]ppellants were not
denied a marriage license because of their sex; rather, they were denied a marriage

197

See Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2006) (―Heterosexual intercourse has a natural
tendency to lead to the birth of children; homosexual intercourse does not. Despite the advances of science,
it remains true that the vast majority of children are born as a result of a sexual relationship between a man
and a woman, and the Legislature could find that this will continue to be true. The Legislature could also
find that such relationships are all too often casual or temporary.‖).
198
See id.
199
See id. at 7 (―Intuition and experience suggest that a child benefits from having before his or her eyes,
every day, living models of what both a man and a woman are like.‖).
200
See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 883 (Vt. 1999) (―In short, the marriage laws transform a private
agreement into a source of significant public benefits and protections.‖).
201
Nancy Polikoff argues that the focus on marriage is inappropriate, even if marriage is fully expanded to
gay and lesbian couples, because it limits state protections to particular family types. See POLIKOFF supra
note 39, at 123. Marriage fails to protect other living arrangements, such as extended families, friends, or
group living arrangements where individuals might depend upon each other. See id. at 132–43. If the
state‘s interest in marriage is promoting social stability, then the state should not limit the protections of
marriage to traditional romantic partnerships. See id.
202
See, e.g., Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 872 (Iowa 2009) (―[Same-sex couples] seek to declare the
marriage statute unconstitutional so they can obtain the array of benefits of marriage enjoyed by
heterosexual couples, protect themselves and their children, and demonstrate to one another and to society
their mutual commitment.‖).
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license because of the nature of marriage itself.‖203 State power to issue a marriage
license is used to define the contours of marriage as a social goal. 204 Courts that expand
marriage rights might similarly stress marriage as a social achievement: ―[I]t would make
little sense to recognize a right of privacy with respect to other matters of family life and
not with respect to the decision to enter the relationship that is the foundation of the
family in our society.‖205 Baehr recognizes legal rights that support marriage‘s position
as ―the relationship that is the foundation of the family.‖ 206 By stressing marriage as the
foundation of the family and society, the courts reinforce norms that exclude alternate
definitions of family.
¶91
In traditional discussions of marriage‘s proper role in society, sexuality and the act
of sex emerge as dangerous. Marriage becomes a necessary control on heterosexuality.
This emerges as courts discuss ―hav[ing] an unplanned pregnancy.‖ 207 The whole state
apparatus becomes directed at protecting against dangerous sexuality:
The State . . . may legitimately create the institution of opposite-sex
marriage . . . in order to encourage male-female couples to procreate
within the legitimacy and stability of a state-sanctioned relationship and to
discourage unplanned, out-of-wedlock births resulting from ―casual‖
intercourse.208
Because procreation is fundamental to survival of the human race, the state should
elevate marriage‘s status in order to regulate procreation. 209
¶92
It is certainly true that unplanned pregnancies are a valid social concern. However,
when Morrison stresses that marriage is important because ―‗accidents‘ do happen,‖ 210 it
relies on a cultural norm that assumes intimate relationships should produce children in
the context of marriage. Family is defined as a married couple with children. These
discussions of unplanned pregnancies assert that: (1) heterosexuality is dangerous and
unplanned pregnancies will always occur, (2) opposite sex partners should marry because
unplanned pregnancy is better handled within marriage, and (3) marriage is properly
based on these heteronormative assumptions because the state‘s primary interest is
controlling procreation.
¶93
This role of marriage in directing procreation is the one place that heterosexuality is
pronounced in these opinions. At first, this seems to contradict earlier arguments that
these opinions assign sexuality to lesbians and gays.211 To be sure, there is some tension
203

Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1196 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
Mary Anne Case traces the history of marriage licenses, arguing that the state uses the marriage license
to define social norms. See Case, supra note 14.
205
Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 56 (Haw. 1993), superseded by constitutional amendment, HAW. CONST.
art. I, § 23 (amended 1998).
206
Id.
207
Standhardt v. Superior Court ex rel. Cnty. of Maricopa, 77 P.3d 451, 462 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003).
208
Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 24 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
209
See Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 969 (Wash. 2006) (―DOMA [Defense of Marriage Act] is
constitutional because the legislature was entitled to believe that limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples
furthers procreation, essential to survival of the human race . . . .‖).
210
Morrison, 821 N.E.2d at 25.
211
See, e.g., Kerrigan v. State, 957 A.2d 407, 412 (Conn. 2008) (using the language ―against gay persons
on account of their sexual orientation‖).
204
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here. The same courts that mark gays and lesbians may recognize straight sexuality in at
least some contexts. Juxtaposing these arguments, courts are in fact constructing
heterosexuality very differently from homosexuality. Heterosexuality generally remains
unmarked, except when it becomes dangerous and threatens ideal family formation. The
state‘s interest in heterosexuality is based on channeling procreation and the family.
Gays and lesbians are marked with deviant sexuality, which is inherently dangerous and
incapable of ―normal‖ procreation. The state‘s interest in homosexuality is based on
controlling deviance.212
¶94
Finally, as they begin to recognize claims for same-sex marriage, courts expand the
normative range of marriage to include lesbians and gays. In Baehr, the Supreme Court
of Hawaii writes ―Marriage is a state-conferred legal partnership status, the existence of
which gives rise to a multiplicity of rights and benefits reserved exclusively to that
particular relation.‖213 Brause similarly expands marriage‘s goals: ―The court finds that
marriage, i.e., the recognition of one‘s choice of a life partner, is a fundamental right.‖ 214
By refusing to link marriage to procreation, the Alaska Superior Court refuses to define
marriage and family exclusively around procreation. Nonetheless, marriage remains a
valid institution as the proper model of romantic relationships. 215 In these opinions,
lesbian and gay sexuality is no longer deviant. Instead, like heterosexuality, lesbian and
gay sexuality is dangerous and must be contained. The state‘s interest in marriage is
transformed from regulation of heterosexuality into regulation of all sexuality.
¶95
By distinguishing between the benefits of marriage and the institution of marriage
itself, courts deconstruct marriage. 216 The state may claim that marriage protects
procreation or child-rearing,217 but in focusing on the rights and benefits of marriage
courts stress marriage as a civil contract. Marriage becomes less about procreation and
more about a package of rights and benefits. As a civil contract, marriage remains a
normative control on sexuality.
¶96
In Baker, the Vermont Supreme Court explains that ―the marriage laws transform a
private agreement into a source of significant public benefits and protections.‖ 218 The
Goodridge opinion expands this further to include responsibilities: ―For those who
choose to marry, and for their children, marriage provides an abundance of legal,
212

Even some opinions that have not described homosexuality as deviant have still marked it as different in
some sense. See, e.g., Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743, at *6
(Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998), superseded by constitutional amendment, ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25
(amendment eff. 1999) (discussing ―nontraditional‖ unions).
213
Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 58 (Haw. 1993), superseded by constitutional amendment, HAW. CONST.
art. I, § 23 (amended 1998).
214
Brause, 1998 WL 88743, at *1.
215
The Vermont Supreme Court made this explicit by discussing social science evidence of the benefits of
marriage for gay and lesbian couples. See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 883–84 (Vt. 1999) (including
inheritance rights, right to bring wrongful death suit, insurance benefits, presumption of joint ownership of
property, and hospital visitation rights).
216
See, e.g., id. at 886.
217
In more recent cases, states have not always asserted these interests, claiming for example interests in
the traditional definition of marriage. See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008),
superseded by constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5 (amended 2008) (Attorney General of
California asserts interests in traditional definition of marriage and separation of powers; interveners assert
other interests in procreation).
218
Baker, 744 A.2d at 883.
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financial, and social benefits. In return it imposes weighty legal, financial, and social
obligations.‖219 The state may continue to have an interest in regulating access to this
package of benefits, but courts provide greater individual autonomy by casting marriage
as a package of civil rights and benefits.
¶97
Thus, when courts are willing to consider the benefits of marriage as distinct from
marriage itself, they necessarily emphasize how the state uses civil rights and benefits to
reward couples and families conforming to a particular model of romantic relationships.
In Li, the Supreme Court of Oregon does this through analysis of the marriage statute,
writing that ―although the text of the measure prohibits same-sex marriage itself, it omits
any reference to the benefits of marriage.‖220 Courts‘ willingness to engage in this
deconstruction of marriage may have the added benefit of forcing states to better
articulate what they are regulating.
V.

INCREASED RESPECT FOR INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY

¶98

Increased respect for individual sexual autonomy emerges as a final theme in more
recent cases. Typically, broader room for autonomy occurs in cases that grant same-sex
couples the right to marry. 221 This has four important consequences: (1) sexuality is
allowed to become more public, (2) marriage is separated from its heteronormative
patriarchal history, (3) cases provide better reasoning to prevent future political
discrimination, and (4) cases provide better doctrine to expand to other issues of
sexuality.
¶99
The first consequence, more public sexuality, recognizes the importance of
sexuality in lived experiences of all persons.222 Cases that protect same-sex partner rights
vary in how much they discuss public expression of sexuality. Kerrigan uses a formal,
legal tone to protect same-sex marriage rights.223 The opinion determines that sexual
orientation, as a legal category, is a quasi-suspect classification. 224 Kerrigan mentions
the plaintiffs as the parties that brought the legal challenge to the state‘s laws, but does
not discuss sexuality in the plaintiffs‘ lives.225 Sexual orientation is defined as a legal
category through case law, legal scholarship, and other sources of evidence. For
example, in discussing the history of discrimination faced by gays and lesbians, Kerrigan
focuses on how legislation and court decisions have restricted gays and lesbians. 226
219

Goodridge v. Dep‘t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 941 (Mass. 2003).
Li v. State, 110 P.3d 91, 98 (Or. 2005) (emphasis in original).
221
Baehr provides a counter-example requiring the state to provide a compelling interest to deny same-sex
couples the right to marry, but based on sex discrimination with narrow conception of sexuality as
behaviors. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), superseded by constitutional amendment, HAW.
CONST. art. I, § 23 (amended 1998).
222
See Johnson & Henderson, supra note 158 (discussing critical importance of lived experience to
understanding sexuality).
223
For example, at one point the decision states, ―Of course, gay persons have been subjected to such
severe and sustained discrimination because of our culture‘s long-standing intolerance of intimate
homosexual conduct.‖ Kerrigan v. State, 957 A.2d 407, 433 (Conn. 2008).
224
Id. at 431–32.
225
Id. (―For the reasons that follow, we agree with the plaintiffs' claim that sexual orientation meets all of
the requirements of a quasi-suspect classification.‖).
226
Id. at 432–434 (citing legal scholarship, the American Psychiatric Association, case law, Surgeon
General and other government reports, and state and federal laws).
220
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Sexual orientation is protected as a legal category, but there is no sense of how it matters
in individuals‘ lives.
To a large extent, the court just did its job: a state supreme court should focus on
broad legal questions more than individual plaintiffs. And as a legal matter, Kerrigan
protects sexual orientation. However, treating sexual orientation as an abstract legal
category matters. Sexual orientation becomes something that can and potentially should
be thought of as unconnected to peoples‘ daily lives. The formal, legal tone of Kerrigan
can be read to reinforce cultural norms that suggest sexuality should be hidden. Even if
individuals are free to define their sexuality, it is expected to be private and hidden. To
some extent, this complaint is not restricted to sexuality. Courts write about gender, race,
and class as abstract legal categories. On this point, it is instructive to compare Kerrigan
to Varnum and Goodridge. 227
Goodridge describes the plaintiffs as ―fourteen individuals from five Massachusetts
counties.‖228 The court describes the relationships between the plaintiffs, but never labels
these as same-sex or gay couples. Later in the opinion, the court notes that ―[t]he rights
implicated in this case are at the core of individual privacy and autonomy.‖ 229
Throughout the opinion, sexuality is something that matters to specific plaintiffs, rather
than just an abstract legal category.
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Iowa creates broad space for sexuality. 230 The
opinion begins with a discussion of the plaintiffs as individuals ―includ[ing] a nurse,
business manager, insurance analyst, bank agent, stay-at-home parent, church organist
and piano teacher, museum director, federal employee, social worker, teacher, and two
retired teachers.‖231 Varnum continues to describe the plaintiffs as family members.
―Like many Iowans, some have children and others hope to have children. Some are
foster parents.‖232 Later, the opinion recognizes sexuality as broader than sexual
behavior. ―Sexual orientation influences the formation of personal relationships between
all people—heterosexual, gay, or lesbian—to fulfill each person‘s fundamental needs for
love and attachment.‖233 Structurally this opinion also stresses a broader understanding
of sexuality. After describing the parties, the decision deconstructs marriage, stressing
the ways in which marriage is a public affirmation of a couple‘s relationship. 234 The
opinion creates marriage as a broad construct for a range of sexuality before discussing
equal protection and other concerns.
Both Goodridge and Varnum attach sexuality to real people and real lives.
Sexuality is more than just a legal question. While Goodridge and Varnum serve the
227

Both Connecticut and Iowa granted same-sex couples the right to marry, but Varnum situated sexuality
in everyday social relations. Comparing these opinions reveals different assumptions about the role of
sexuality in everyday life. Compare id. (citing legal scholarship, the American Psychiatric Association,
case law, Surgeon General and other government reports, and state and federal laws), with Varnum v.
Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 873 (Iowa 2009) (―Yet, perhaps the ultimate disadvantage expressed in the
testimony of the plaintiffs is the inability to obtain for themselves and for their children the personal and
public affirmation that accompanies marriage.‖).
228
Goodridge v. Dep‘t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 949 (Mass. 2003).
229
Id. at 957, n.15.
230
See Varnum, 763 N.W.2d 862.
231
Id. at 872.
232
Id.
233
Id. at 893.
234
See supra note 227.
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same legal function as Kerrigan—determining as a matter of law whether sexual
orientation is a suspect classification and whether same-sex couples can claim a right to
marriage—they both avoid the formal legal tone of Kerrigan. This provides greater
affirmation and social support of non-heteronormative sexualities. In particular, Varnum
uses a public affirmation of sexuality to deconstruct the patriarchal history of marriage.
By allowing sexuality to be fully expressed, the court refuses to base marriage on limited
notions of sexuality.
¶104
These cases typically hold that sexual orientation is a quasi-suspect or suspect
class, creating equal protection doctrine that can be used in future challenges. 235 As one
illustration, Kerrigan directly recognizes the failure of the political process to protect
sexual orientation, ―[d]espite the truly laudable effort of the legislature in equalizing the
legal rights afforded same sex and opposite sex couples.‖ 236 This reasoning directly
supports any future efforts to address how the political system constrains expressions of
sexuality.
¶105
Comparing Goodridge and Varnum supports my argument for protecting same-sex
marriage based on equal protection. While Goodridge forcefully protects the right of
same-sex couples to marry, it does so on the basis of the strong social values attached to
marriage.237 This rhetorical construction emphasizes the values of marriage more than
reasons to protect sexuality. Same-sex marriage is constitutionally protected because
marriage itself is fundamentally protected, and the state has no interest in restricting
marriage. Marriage remains normatively desirable, and sexuality may not be protected in
future cases that do not include a fundamental right.
¶106
Varnum, on the other hand, places a strong emphasis on why sexual orientation is a
suspect classification.238 Varnum provides a strong rationale for future protection of
other claims to expression of sexuality. Same-sex marriage is constitutionally protected
because sexual orientation ―bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to
society.‖239 The state must meet high barriers to discriminate on the basis of sexual
orientation. While Goodridge necessarily discusses protection of sexuality, 240 and
Varnum discusses the social values of marriage, 241 the different emphases reveal
potentially different degrees of protecting sexuality.
VI.
¶107

CONCLUSION

In this Comment, I argued that we should be concerned with judicial assumptions
about sexuality, provided a methodology to study these assumptions, and criticized the
constructions of sexuality in state same-sex marriage opinions. Some same-sex marriage
opinions intend to portray gays and lesbians as deviant or otherwise constrain sexuality.
235

See supra notes 129–131 and accompanying text.
Kerrigan v. State, 957 A.2d 407, 419 (Conn. 2008).
237
Goodridge v. Dep‘t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948, 965 (Mass. 2003).
238
Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 888–94 (Iowa 2009).
239
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973).
240
In various places the opinion notes that allowing same-sex couples to marry will protect against
―prejudices against persons who are (or who are believed to be) homosexual.‖ See, e.g., Goodridge, 798
N.E.2d at 968. Goodridge does not consider whether sexuality should be protected as a suspect
classification, so it does not directly consider the question of protection of sexuality.
241
Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 883–84.
236
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Many opinions appear simply not to consider how they are drawing on particular cultural
assumptions about sexuality. But even when opinions intend to protect sexual orientation
through equal protection, they may use language that reinforces cultural norms of
sexuality or marriage as more limited.
¶108
The most recent same-sex marriage opinions make great strides towards protecting
individual autonomy with respect to sexuality. These cases protect individual autonomy
by making sexual orientation a suspect classification. Courts in California, Connecticut,
and Iowa have used equal protection instead of fundamental rights to extend marriage to
same-sex couples. However, these cases could still push equal protection analysis further
by focusing on how laws and social structures create and define hierarchies of sexuality.
This requires a more fundamental change in equal protection doctrine, but it would allow
courts to more broadly recognize the social construction of sexuality.
¶109
Beyond same-sex marriage jurisprudence, the arguments in this Comment are
applicable to how courts write about sexuality in all areas of the law. Legal scholars
should pay more attention to how the specific language used in these cases matters.
Whether or not they recognize it, courts are playing an active role in the construction of
sexuality.
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APPENDIX

Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971).
Dismissed claim that state marriage laws included same-sex couples because by
definition marriage is between a man and a woman.
Additional procedural notes: Plaintiffs, Richard Baker and James McConnell, brought
suit after applying for a marriage license with the Hennepin County Clerk. While Baker
v. Nelson was on appeal to the Minnesota Supreme Court, the plaintiffs obtained a
marriage license from the Blue Earth County Court Clerk. McConnell v. Nooner, 547
F.2d 54, 55 (8th Cir. 1976) (noting the later marriage license was invalidated by Baker v.
Nelson). An appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court was dismissed for lack of substantial
federal question. See Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972) (NO. 71-1027). McConnell
sought federal recognition of this marriage license in two subsequent cases. See
McConnell, 547 F.2d 54 (denying claim for greater veteran benefits because same-sex
partner cannot be dependent spouse if marriage is not recognized by state); McConnell v.
United States, No. Civ.04-2711, 2005 WL 19458 (D. Minn. Jan. 3, 2005) (dismissing suit
to compel IRS to recognize amended return claiming married status, based on claim
preclusion from McConnell v. Nooner where IRS was originally listed as a defendant).
Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973).
Dismissed claim that state marriage laws include same-sex couples because definition of
marriage is fundamental and understood.
Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
Held that state marriage laws did not violate due process and equal protection clauses of
state constitution and did not violate state Equal Right Amendment (for sex
discrimination).
Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
Held that there is no fundamental right to same-sex marriage under the state constitution
but remanded to the lower court to determine if the state had a compelling interest to
justify the marriage statute as a classification based on sex.
Additional procedural notes: On remand the intermediate court of appeals held that the
state did not have a compelling interest, Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235
(Cir. Ct. of Haw. Dec. 3, 1996), but a state constitutional amendment authorized the
legislature to define marriage as between a man and a woman, HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23
(amended 1998).
Dean v. D.C., 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995).
Held that gender-neutral marriage statutes did not include same-sex couples and no due
process or equal protection claim to same-sex marriage (no majority on constitutional
reasoning).
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Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743 (Alaska
Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998).
Held that state marriage statutes violated a fundamental right to choose one‘s partner.
Additional procedural notes: Court set further hearings to require the state to present a
compelling interest to justify excluding same-sex couples from marriage. While further
court action was pending, Alaska amended its constitution to ban same-sex marriage.
ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25 (amended 1999).
Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
Held that denying the rights and benefits of marriage to same-sex couples violated the
state constitution‘s common benefits clause.
Additional procedural notes: The Vermont legislature enacted civil unions to comply
with this ruling, which did not require full marriage equality.
Standhardt v. Superior Court ex rel. County of Maricopa, 77 P.3d 451 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2003).
Held that there is no fundamental right to same-sex marriage, and it is not required by
state constitution privacy provisions. No equal protection violation because same-sex
marriage is not a fundamental right.
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
Held that marriage is a fundamental right, and the state cannot deny that right to same-sex
couples. The court did not consider whether sexuality was a suspect classification
because it held that the state could not satisfy rational basis review.
Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
Held that the state‘s Defense of Marriage Act did not violate state equal protection or due
process guarantees.
Li v. State, 110 P.3d 91 (Or. 2005).
Held that state constitutional amendment and previous statutes defined marriage as
between a man and a woman. The court refused to formally consider a claim that the
benefits of marriage could be separated from the institution.
Additional procedural notes: The lower court held that same-sex couples must be given
the right to same-sex marriage after a court challenge was initiated when Multnomah
County officials began issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples. Li v. State, No.
0403-03057, 2004 WL 4963162 (Cir. Ct. of Or. Apr. 29, 2004), rev’d, 110 P.3d 91
(2005). While the case was on appeal to the Supreme Court of Oregon, the state
amended its constitution to define marriage as between a man and a woman. See OR.
CONST. art. XV, § 5a (amended 2004). The decision of the state supreme court was
based on this amendment.
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Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006).
Held that the state domestic relations law did not violate due process or equal protection
and could not be construed to include same-sex couples.
Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006).
Held that sexual orientation is not a protected classification for equal protection and
statutes satisfy rational basis because of state interest in procreation and child rearing.
Marriage statute does not violate due process because there is no history and tradition of
same-sex marriage.
Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006).
Held that same-sex marriage was not a fundamental right but that the state must provide
the same rights and benefits of marriage to same-sex couples under equal protection
analysis.
Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571 (Md. 2007).
Upheld state marriage statutes because they did not classify on the basis of sex; sexual
orientation was not a suspect classification; and the right to same-sex marriage was not a
fundamental right. Interest in protecting procreation was over and under inclusive, but
allowed under rational basis review.
In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).
Held that sexual orientation is a suspect classification and the state could not meet strict
scrutiny for its marriage statutes. Also held that same-sex couples are protected by the
fundamental right to marriage, but strict scrutiny analysis not formally based on
fundamental rights.
Additional procedural notes: This decision was overturned by Proposition 8, a voter
approved constitutional amendment. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5 (amended 2008). In the
federal case challenging Proposition 8, the Federal District Court held that it violated the
equal protection clause of the federal constitution. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. C
09-2292 VRW, 2010 WL 3025614 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2010). This was based on
extensive findings of fact that show that the state has no rational basis to provide
marriage to opposite-sex couples and not same-sex couples, and the proposition was
passed based on animus towards a social group. Perry is presently on appeal.
Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008).
Held that sexual orientation is a quasi-suspect classification and gays and lesbians have a
legally cognizable injury despite state provision of civil unions. Uniformity of laws with
other jurisdictions and traditional definition of marriage are not sufficient state interests
to deny same-sex couples right to marry.
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Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
Held that sexual orientation is a suspect classification and receives heightened scrutiny.
The court did not decide whether sexual orientation received intermediate or strict
scrutiny because it held that the state could not meet intermediate scrutiny.
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